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1  iNtRODUctiON 
1.1  Objectives of the study
In 1990, Namibia emerged from colonial rule with a skewed distribution of agricultural 
land and high levels of poverty. The new government led by SWAPO Party initiated a 
process to address the land question within the first few months of Independence. A 
National Conference on Land Reform and the Land Question in 1991 was the foundation on 
which the Namibian government developed its land reform programme. The Ministry of 
Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation started in 1990 to acquire freehold farmland for 
subdivision and allocation to previously disadvantaged Namibians. This component of 
redistributive land reform was complemented by the Affirmative Action Loan Scheme (AALS) 
established in 1992. The AALS provided subsidised loans to previously disadvantaged 
Namibians to acquire large-scale commercial farms under freehold title.
The primary objectives of land reform in Namibia were to address injustices which large-
scale land dispossession had brought about, and to reduce poverty and inequality. However, 
little empirical work has been done to assess the impact of land redistribution on poverty 
levels and the livelihoods of beneficiaries. The most comprehensive survey on the impact of 
land redistribution was conducted by the Permanent Technical Team on Land Reform (PTT) 
in 2003/04. The primary objective of this survey on “livelihoods after land reform” is to add 
to the existing body of knowledge on land redistribution.
Through case studies in Hardap and Omaheke Regions, the survey explored the extent to 
which land redistribution is reducing poverty and meeting livelihood improvement objectives. 
The specific research objectives were the following:1
1. Provide empirical data, in a systematic and comparable form, on livelihood impacts and 
agrarian structure in the post-land reform setting.
2. Understand what conditions – including appropriate land transfer mechanisms, resettle-
ment models, tenure arrangements and post-settlement support – are likely to result in 
poverty reduction following land redistribution.
3. Advance conceptual thinking about post-transfer livelihood options, interrogating what 
is meant by ‘viable’ land reform in the southern African context.
4. Develop replicable methodological approaches for assessing impacts at different scales – 
e.g. household, scheme/project, regional economy – for use as assessment and monitoring 
and evaluation tools.
1 Verbatim excerpt from the official LaLR website home page (http://www.lalr.org.za).
Section A ● 1. intr duction
4 ● Livelihoods after land reform: Namibia country report (2010)
An important element of this research was gauging how beneficiaries perceive the benefits 
or otherwise of land reform. The information they provided in this regard made it possible to 
examine the notion of ‘viability’ in a different light. While acknowledging the importance 
of economic considerations in land use, the study has shown that for many beneficiaries, 
these have been only some of the considerations, albeit important ones, with regard to 
resettle ment. Other considerations such as a secure home or a place for retirement were in 
many cases more important than those of agricultural production. In this regard, this report 
complements the book entitled This is my land (von Wietersheim, 2008) which documents 
beneficiaries’ perceptions of the impact of improved access to land.
This study was carried out as part of a research project covering Zimbabwe, South Africa 
and Namibia, co-ordinated by the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies at the 
University of the Western Cape in South Africa. The overall aim of the project was to provide 
information which would enable a comparison of the impacts of land reform on livelihoods 
and the wider patterns of agrarian change after land reform in different settings across 
selected sites in three southern African countries.
1.2 Research methodology
For the study in Namibia, Hardap and Omaheke Regions were selected as the main research 
areas. One reason for this is that the agro-ecological characteristics of these regions broadly 
correspond to those of Limpopo and Masvingo Provinces, the main research areas in South 
Africa and Zimbabwe respectively. Within Hardap and Omaheke, the oldest resettlement 
and AALS farms were selected for the research based on the assumption that the impact 
of land reform on beneficiary livelihoods would be more pronounced on these farms than 
on farms settled more recently. Proposals for research farms were discussed with Regional 
Council representatives in separate meetings in Mariental in Hardap and Gobabis in Omaheke, 
and shortlists were agreed upon. For the research in Hardap, an attempt was made to select 
an equal number of respondents in Maltahöhe and Mariental Districts to reflect the different 
agro-ecological characteristics of the western and eastern parts of the region.
Group resettlement schemes were integrated into the sample in both regions. The schemes 
were Bernafey and Westfalen in Hardap, and Skoonheid and Drimiopsis in Omaheke. 
Approximately 40% of the official group scheme beneficiaries were interviewed on the 
latter two schemes. 
For logistical and other reasons, resettlement farms were clustered. In Hardap the farms 
Halifax, Mara and Tulpvlei in Maltahöhe District formed a cluster, and Jackalsdraai, Weiveld 
and Panorma in Mariental District formed a cluster. In the latter district, Sekretarispan had to 
be studied separately as an outlier.
In Omaheke, four farms around Skoonheid, namely Rusplaas, Rosenhof, Grootrooibult and 
Danel, formed a cluster, and Du Plessis was also close enough to be included. Most of the field 
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sites in Omaheke were in Steinhausen Constituency, and interviews were also conducted in 
Gobabis, Kalahari and Otjombinde Constituencies.
A desk study on land reform in Namibia in general and the two target regions in particular 
provided the background for the fieldwork. The Hardap fieldwork was carried out between 
August 2007 and March 2008, and the Omaheke fieldwork in September, November and 
December 2008. The findings for each region were written up in a draft report. Sequencing 
the fieldwork in this way enabled the research team to review its experiences in Hardap 
before commencing with the work in Omaheke.
The research process was the same in each region. The first step was to visit the identified 
group resettlement schemes, resettlement farms and part-time farmers to conduct qualitative 
semi-structured interviews. This step served firstly to introduce the study and the research 
team to beneficiaries and secure their willingness to participate, and secondly to obtain 
information on beneficiaries’ life histories. These interviews were subsequently transcribed. 
The second step was a quantitative survey, for which a questionnaire was developed based 
on examples from Namibia, Zimbabwe and Limpopo Province in South Africa. In Hardap the 
questionnaire was directed to the same beneficiaries whose life histories had been recorded 
in the qualitative interviews. 
Having completed the quantitative survey in Hardap, the team realised that the questionnaire 
was too ambitious in scope. Firstly, the respondents were intimidated by the number of 
questions. Then, many questions on livelihoods that were relevant in Masvingo and Limpopo 
proved irrelevant in the Namibian context. Moreover, the small sample of interviewees 
Sect on A ● 1.  intr duction
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created problems of interpretation and generalisation. The questionnaire was simplified 
to make it more ‘user-friendly’ for Omaheke, but still it remained a fairly long questionnaire. 
While the resettlement and AALS beneficiary sample was small in Omaheke, two sizeable 
group resettlement schemes, namely Skoonheid and Drimiopsis, allowed for interviewing 
representative samples.
Due to time and budgetary limits, it was impossible to obtain samples of the three main 
categories of land reform beneficiaries large enough to allow for statistical generalisations. 
Long distances between beneficiaries were a major limiting factor in terms of time and 
costs. It was not uncommon that after making appropriate arrangements for interviews, 
the team arrived only to find that the respondent had left the farm for some urgent business 
in town or on a neighbouring farm. Since many of the small-scale farmers on resettlement 
farm units do not have telephones, the team often had to arrive out of the blue and hope 
that interviewees were available.
In mitigation of these logistical problems, it should be remembered that it was never an 
aim of this study to provide information that is statistically valid for the entire country. The 
purpose of the quantitative survey was to provide some empirical data on the beneficiaries 
interviewed, while the main aim of the study was to generate qualitative information aimed 
at explaining and describing perceptions and processes.
Information on the farms selected and the number of interviews conducted on each farm is 
presented below for small-scale farming resettlement or Farm Unit Resettlement Schemes, 
group resettlement schemes and the AALS. 
skoonheid group resettlement scheme, Omaheke.
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Farm Unit Resettlement Schemes (FURS)
Table 1 below reflects the numbers and locations of the FURS respondents in Hardap and 
Omaheke. In Hardap, 15 full-time and 4 part-time farmers were interviewed and all also 
responded to the quantitative questionnaire. In Omaheke, 8 full-time and 12 part-time farmers 
were interviewed, and a total of 12 responded to the questionnaire. Unfavourable weather 
conditions (heavy rains and floods) limited the number of FURS respondents in Omaheke.
table 1: FURs survey sites and number of beneficiaries interviewed
REgiON FaRM NaME siZE (ha) YEaR BOUgHt
iNtERviEWs QUEstiONNaiRE
Full-time Part-time Full-time Part-time
Hardap
Mara 4 303 1991 3 3
Tulpvlei 2 810 1991 1 1
Halifax 2 758 1991 1 1
Jackalsdraai 4 601 1991 3 3
Weiveld 5 481 1991 1 1 1 1
Uitsicht 5 000 1991 1 1 1 1
Panorama 5 721 1991 1 1 1 1
Sekretarispan 5 439 1991 4 1 4 1
Total Hardap 15 4 15 4
Omaheke
Grootrooibult 5 489 1996 2 0 (of 2)
Rosenhof 3 406 1993 2 3 (of 8)




Wolseley 5 042 1992 2
Du Plessis 4 102 1997 6 5
Total Omaheke 8 12 12
total all 23 16 31
Group resettlement schemes
In total, 37 beneficiaries on group resettlement schemes were interviewed and 49 responded to 
the questionnaire. The two schemes in Omaheke supported many more beneficiaries than 
the two in Hardap. The sample size in Omaheke can be regarded as fairly representative 
of the two schemes – said with some reservation due to the ever-fluctuating numbers of 
people living on these schemes. As will become clear, beneficiaries of group resettlement 
schemes differ from other beneficiaries to a high degree in terms of personal characteristics 
as well as resettlement aspirations and expectations.
table 2: group resettlement survey sites and number of beneficiaries interviewed
REgiON FaRM NaME siZE (ha) YEaR BOUgHt iNtERviEWs QUEstiONNaiRE
Hardap
Bernafey 3 729 1995 3 3
Westfalen 1 191 1995 1 1
Total Hardap 4 4
Omaheke
Skoonheid 7 104 1993 17 21
Drimiopsis 2 262 1991 16 24
Total Omaheke 33 45
total all 37 49
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Affirmative Action Loan Scheme (AALS)
The number of AALS beneficiaries interviewed was limited relative to the other groups. 
The main reason for this is that they are the only possible respondents on their large-scale 
commercial farms, and some were unable to keep the appointment for the interview. Due to 
the long distances between farms, it was not logistically feasible to reschedule appointments, 
and a few long journeys were taken in vain. By contrast, FURS and group resettlement farms 
with their multitudes of beneficiaries provided alternative respondents for interviews. Also, 
as with the FURS sample, unfavourable weather conditions (heavy rains and floods) posed a 
problem for reaching AALS beneficiaries in Omaheke.
In Hardap a total of 10 AALS farmers were interviewed, of whom 6 were full-time and 4 were 
part-time farmers. Their farm sizes ranged from 3 500 ha to 20 000 ha. In Omaheke, a total 
of 5 AALS farmers responded to the questionnaire, of whom 3 were full-time and 2 were 
part-time farmers. Their farm sizes ranged from 4 000 ha to 5 000 ha.
The Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit (NEPRU) attended to the data capturing, 
cleaning and analysis for Hardap, and Survey Warehouse did the same for Omaheke. The 
latter also conducted further fieldwork in Omaheke in February and March 2009.
Gathering quantitative data by means of a ‘normal’ survey proved challenging as the farm-
level economic data was very patchy. This is partly due to beneficiaries, particularly in the 
FURS category, not having recorded incomes and expenditures for their farming and other 
economic operations. For the group resettlement schemes, economic data at both scheme 
and household level was impossible to obtain. The absence or lack of this data makes it very 
difficult to calculate farm budgets and gross margins based on production data. In turn this 
means that no significant conclusions can be drawn as to whether or not land redistribution 
has improved the beneficiaries’ economic livelihoods. This problem is exacerbated by the 
fact that no baseline data exists against which comparisons can be made.
Collecting data in group resettlement schemes in Omaheke was a challenge on its own. 
Obtaining information on dates, ages and numbers of livestock and people was a major 
problem. Not only were most beneficiaries functionally illiterate, but also they had differing 
notions of time and numbers. In some cases it was impossible to establish the number of 
children in a family, and in many cases, dates of birth and settlement could not be ascertained; 
only those possessing an identification document knew their precise date of birth. 
Despite the problems experienced in gathering quantitative data, the research team believes 
that the qualitative information presented in this report will prove useful in assessing 
the impact that land reform has had on the livelihoods of beneficiaries. The beneficiary 
testimonies recorded herein will make clear that the benefits of access to land cannot be 
reduced to economic gains in all cases. The allocation of a small parcel of land was the only 
option for many previously disadvantaged Namibians to establish a home of their own, 
secure in the belief that they will not have to move again, and that their children will be able 
to enjoy the sense of stability that a family home normally provides.
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2.1 Rural poverty in Namibia
Namibia is reputed to have the most unequal distribution of income of all countries. Its 
Gini Coefficient of 0.63 in 2003/04 placed it right at the top of a selection of 30 countries. 
Explanations for this state of affairs include that the racist policies of the apartheid regime 
prior to Independence restricted the access of the majority of citizens to economic and social 
resources. In addition, Namibia’s traditional reliance on the extraction of natural resources 
such as diamonds has meant that production is highly capital intensive rather than labour 
intensive (Central Bureau of Statistics 2008: 37).
Who are the poor? The National Land Policy defines the poor as people who are “landless 
or … with little or insufficient access to land who are not in formal employment or engaged 
in non-agricultural activities” (RoN 1998a: 1). The National Planning Commission (NPC) 
recently put forward a narrower definition. This has been elaborated in the review of poverty 
and inequality which is based on the expenditure data of the 2003/04 Namibia Household 
Income and Expenditure Survey (NHIES) conducted by the NPC’s Central Bureau of Statistics. 
Based on the cost of basic needs, this definition of poverty replaces the previous one which 
defined poverty in terms of the food share ratio of expenditure. The cost of basic needs 
definition acknowledges the fact that even if households are able to meet the basic food 
requirements of all their members, they are still deprived if they lack the resources required 
to purchase clothing and shelter. 
The review of poverty established a food poverty line based on a minimum nutritional intake 
of 2 100 kcal per day per adult, amounting to a cash requirement of N$127.15 per month 
per capita. Non-food expenditures were added to the food poverty line to arrive at a lower 
bound poverty line describing “severely poor” households and an upper bound poverty line 
describing “poor” households. The monthly Namibia Dollar values per person for different 
poverty lines are as follows:
Poverty line 2003/2004 (N$)
Food poverty line 127.15
Lower bound poverty line – “severely poor” 184.56
Upper bound poverty line – “poor” 262.45
source: CBS 2008: 3
2  LaND REFORM aND 
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The upper bound poverty line of N$262.45 per month per capita translates to an annual 
amount of N$3 149 per person or N$15 747 per household of 5 people. Therefore, technically 
speaking, the average Namibian household of slightly more than 5 people earning less than 
N$15 747 per annum is defined as poor.
Using this definition of poverty, the review calculated that 27.6% of all Namibians were 
poor, and 13.8% of those were severely poor (ibid.: 6). Most poor households were found 
in rural rather than urban areas. Just over 38% of rural households were poor, and 19% 
of those were severely poor. The corresponding figures for urban areas were 12% and 6% 
(ibid.: 10). 
In the study area, 32% of households in Hardap Region were poor, and 22% of those were 
severely poor. The situation in Omaheke was marginally better with 30% of households 
being poor and 17.5% of those severely poor (ibid.).
Realising that statistical information provides only a static snapshot of poverty with little 
indication of how people themselves perceive poverty, government initiated a programme of 
participatory poverty assessment (PPA) in all 13 regions of the country from 2004-2006. 
The main objective of the PPAs was to acquire a deeper understanding of poverty by gauging 
the perspectives of poor people themselves. The information obtained added some meat to 
the statistics on poverty by establishing how the poor understood poverty and well-being 
and what they did to cope with poverty.
In Omaheke there was general agreement among the participants in different groups that 
poverty is a “condition of earning, having and owning close to nothing and depending on 
other people for one’s livelihood from day to day” (NPC 2006a: 36). There was also general 
agreement as to what constitutes “well-being”. Rural communities stated that well-being 
is defined by the ownership of assets, especially livestock, and additional income through 
employment. Access to land for grazing and cultivation as well as clean water for humans 
and livestock were seen as fundamental to well-being. Thus, not having access to sufficient 
land and water contributes to rural communities’ vulnerability to poverty (ibid.: 38).
Farm workers likened their lives to those of flies: constantly hungry and moving from one 
place to another in search of food until they fall down and die in the milk. This anecdote 
sums up the high level of mobility of farm workers, who are always on the lookout for 
better living and employment conditions (ibid.). Not having a house or place of their own 
to which they can retreat when they lose their employment contributes to farm workers’ 
vulnerability to poverty (ibid.: 40).
Views on poverty in Hardap were very similar to those in Omaheke. Poverty was defined 
as not having anything on which to build “an existence” and not having any material 
goods such as clothes and decent housing to support an existence. Limited resources for 
subsistence farming with livestock or gardening were seen as central to poverty. Conversely, 
well-being was defined in terms of ownership of assets, especially livestock, and income 
through formal employment. In view of the importance of farming, well-being relates to 
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access to land for grazing and cultivation, as well as to clean water for people, livestock and 
gardens (NPC 2006b: 49-50).
The definitions of poverty and well-being presented above are not exhaustive, but they 
indicate that for many people, access to land, water and livestock is a fundamental ingredient 
of well-being. This perception has found its way into national policies and political rhetoric, 
where land reform is regarded as a fundamental element of poverty reduction. The National 
Land Policy commits government to “seek[ing] to secure and promote the interests of the 
poor” at all times, “ensuring that they are in practice able to enjoy the rights of which they 
are assured in principle” (RoN 1998: 1). The Namibian Cabinet was reported to have stated 
that “without achieving a breakthrough in the land reform programme, the fight against 
poverty would not succeed” (New Era, 22.12.2000-12.1.2001).
Despite these political assurances and promises, Namibia displays a curious disjuncture 
between stated political objectives regarding poverty reduction and the implementation of 
redistributive land reform. While the need to support the poor through improved access to 
land is articulated in many official documents of the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement 
(MLR), the role of land reform in poverty reduction programmes is poorly spelt out in policy 
documents dealing with poverty more specifically. 
Namibia’s principal statement on poverty reduction, the Poverty Reduction Strategy for 
Namibia, was approved by Cabinet in 1998. It does not accord redistributive land reform a 
long-term role in poverty alleviation. Instead, it observes that “the agricultural base is too 
weak to offer a sustainable basis for prosperity”, and foresees that “in a quarter century 
from now, the large majority of the country’s inhabitants … are likely to have moved into 
urban centres …” (RoN 1998b: 3, 5). While the Poverty Reduction Strategy sees significant 
potential for alleviating poverty through the development of the livestock sector, further 
opportunities for the development of cultivation in the freehold or commercial farming 
sector are regarded as limited. It argued that at best, “land reform and an associated shift 
to intensive cultivation could yield a one-time gain for poverty reduction in those few areas 
that are well watered but presently farmed by extensive commercial methods” (ibid.: 10). 
These statements echo the conclusions drawn by a World Bank study on poverty reduction 
that preceded the Poverty Reduction Strategy (World Bank 1997: 12). Land reform did not 
feature at all in the National Poverty Reduction Action Programme 2001-2005 (RoN 2002) 
which was intended to concretise the Poverty Reduction Strategy.
Poverty in Omaheke. Poverty in Hardap.
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Despite the Poverty Reduction Strategy being quiet on the role of land reform in poverty 
reduction programmes, Cabinet has continued to demand that land reform contribute to 
poverty reduction. In April 2006, Cabinet approved the recommendations, strategic options 
and action plan on land reform submitted by the Permanent Technical Team on Land Reform 
(PTT). These include recommendations that the action plans of national programmes such 
as Vision 2030, the National Poverty Reduction Programme and NDP2 (sic) “should specify 
quantifiable indicators and targets relating to poverty reduction, employment creation 
and income distribution in the short term”, and that government should improve the 
screening and selection of beneficiaries by “determining whether current criteria are socially, 
economically and politically appropriate”. In addition:
Urgent attention should be given to the priorities of those groups urgently in need of 
resettlement. Policy should, as a matter of urgency, take into account the priorities of 
disadvantaged groups in need of resettlement, such as farm workers and women …
Policy amendments should encourage community driven resettlement, giving priority 
to beneficiaries who indicate a preference for rural, agriculture-based lifestyles and 
who have agricultural experience and/or other land-based production experience 
(RoN 2006: 2).
These directives are not borne out by NDP3 which was released in 2008. The overarching 
strategies of NDP3 to eradicate extreme hunger and poverty include strengthening and 
diversifying the agricultural base of poor rural communities by, inter alia, encouraging 
diversification and improving agricultural production. However, improved access to land 
through land reform does not feature (RoN 2008: 195). While NDP2 also did not provide 
any detail on how land reform would support a broad-based rural development strategy 
aimed at reducing poverty, it did at least mention that land would be provided to poor, 
landless families (RoN n.d.: 565).
The absence of a discussion of the role of land reform in poverty reduction in NDP3 suggests 
that a fundamental rethink among technocrats on poverty alleviation has taken place in 
recent years. There is evidence that a reassessment of the role of land reform in poverty 
reduction has been underway in the MLR. The first indications of this appeared in the 
Ministry’s Annual Report for 1998/99, which referred to a “paradigm shift in its search for 
an integrated and sustainable resettlement programme”. The report suggested that this 
was a response to both a lack of suitable land for resettlement and budgetary constraints 
for buying, demarcating and upgrading farms.
The paradigm shift appears to have been away from beneficiaries with few assets and little 
experience in agriculture towards those who could bring sufficient assets and experience 
into the process to farm productively. In terms of the new paradigm, “it was imperative to 
expand [the] list of priority groups to include people who can add value to the resettlement 
programme by making a contribution to the maintenance of allotments and pay monthly 
lease amounts to government” (MLRR, Annual Report 1998/99: 33). In a ministerial workshop 
two years later, it was observed that individual beneficiaries were more successful than 
“the poorest of the poor” and provided employment opportunities. In the same workshop, 
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the concern was expressed that “in retrospect the focus on resettlement as the only strategy 
to assist the landless and poor people, particularly the San, may have been unwise” (MLRR 
2001b: 5-6).
In subsequent years, the ability to farm productively or engage successfully in any other 
enterprises offered on resettlement projects became a more prominent criterion in selecting 
beneficiaries for resettlement. It was also expected that those intending to farm with livestock 
should own the appropriate number of animals as determined by the carrying capacity of 
each project. Moreover, beneficiaries should be able to support cost recovery measures such 
as payment for water (MLR, Annual Report 2004/05: 14).
This paradigm shift culminated in the drafting of new selection criteria for potential land 
reform beneficiaries. These are conveyed in the Ministry’s “Draft Resettlement Manual” 
produced in 2008. The criteria state that the ability of beneficiaries to farm productively is 
of paramount importance to the social and economic success of the National Resettlement 
Programme (MLR 2008: 44). Farming productively is the fundamental tenet of the criteria, 
as productivity “contributes towards poverty reduction, improve(s) living standards and 
foster(s) economic development” (ibid.). Consequently, to be considered for resettlement, it is 
necessary to require that applicants demonstrate their ability to farm and that they belong 
to the previously disadvantaged majority – thus “the primary beneficiaries of resettlement 
farms are previously disadvantaged ‘farmers’” (ibid.). In terms of the new selection criteria, 
applicants for resettlement whose livestock numbers match the carrying capacity of the 
farm unit stand a better chance of being allocated land than those with too few or too 
many livestock. Referred to as the “livestock ratio”, this is a means to enable beneficiaries 
to utilise their land optimally right from the start (ibid.: 45-46).
The focus of resettlement is increasingly on economic development, and this leaves little room 
for settling people who have no assets and few farming skills. Von Wietersheim (2008: 120) 
observed a “clear shift from political to economic objectives of land reform”. Earlier aims 
to settle as many black people as possible on white-owned farms appear to have given way 
to the aim of ensuring that beneficiaries contribute to developing the country’s economy. 
Despite the emphasis on the ability to farm, provision is made for resettlement programmes 
of a social welfare type, which offer appropriate support services to accommodate people 
who lack assets (e.g. farm workers) and/or farming skills. Depending on the specific target 
group (war veterans, San community members, people with disabilities, etc.), applications 
for land-based welfare projects should be directed to the responsible line ministry (Health 
and Social Services, Veteran Affairs, etc.) The function of the MLR under this proposal would 
be to make land available for such projects, but not to manage social welfare programmes 
(MLR 2008: 16-17).
What seems to emerge is a discourse on land reform that distinguishes much more clearly 
between ‘economic’ land redistribution and land-based ‘welfare’ programmes. It is not easy 
to trace all the reasons for this altered approach. Financial and administrative costs of 
providing support to beneficiaries appear to be among the reasons for the rethink on poverty 
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reduction. Adams (2001: 3) argued that the change may have “reflected the government’s 
worries about the high cost and the lack of sustainability of attempts to resettle the poor”. 
Budgetary constraints were cited in several annual reports as the reason for government 
no longer being able to provide the support that beneficiaries need. In 2003 a contribution 
to the official newsletter of the MLR quoted the Minister as saying that government would 
no longer be able to provide basic support and food to beneficiaries on a monthly basis (The 
Land, 7(7), 2003: 5).
2.2 the politics of poverty and land reform
Three main factors have shaped and influenced the politics of land reform in Namibia. In 
the first place, the process and pattern of colonial land dispossession affected different 
population groups in Namibia differently. Secondly, political and economic reforms initiated 
by the South African regime in response to the armed struggle were designed to support 
a fledgling black middle class in Namibia by, inter alia, promoting the notion of large-scale 
commercial farming. Finally, post-Independence class interests have determined the nature 
and pace of land reform.
Namibia is probably the only settler colony in which European settlers appropriated large 
areas of agriculturally marginal land, leaving the higher rainfall areas in the hands 
of indigenous population groups. Large-scale land dispossession mainly affected the Herero, 
Nama and Damara communities, who were transhumant livestock farmers in the central 
and southern parts of Namibia. Their loose socio-political structures reflected the need for 
flexibility in the utilisation of natural resources which was essential for surviving in an arid to 
semi-arid environment. At the same time, these same structures made them more vulnerable 
to colonial conquest than communities which practised mixed farming in the north-central and 
north-eastern regions of the country. Strong, centralised structures of those communities 
were a major factor in Germany’s decision not to pursue any large-scale land dispossession 
in those regions. 
Therefore, the majority of the population practising mixed farming in the north-central and 
north-eastern regions have never been dispossessed of their land by a colonial power. To 
be sure, land dispossession and the drawing of international borders have circumscribed 
the mobility of people in the mixed farming areas of north-central and north-eastern 
Namibia. Dispossession in the sense of uprooting and relocating communities to different 
areas has never happened in the same way in those parts of the country as it did further 
south in the former “Police Zone” (Werner 2002: 55; Dobell 1995: 193n). By contrast, the 
dispossessed Herero and Damara communities within the Police Zone were resettled in 
“native reserves” on the eastern and north-western margins of their customary grazing areas. 
While pastures have been abundant in those areas, water remains scarce.
SWAPO, which led the armed struggle against the colonial regime, drew most of its sup-
port from communities in these northern and north-eastern regions, which are still inhab-
ited by close to 60% of Namibia’s population. For the historical reasons just mentioned, 
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the land question did not occupy as central a 
role in SWAPO’s political programme as it did 
in the programmes of political parties which 
represented the dispossessed more broadly, an 
example being the South West Africa National 
Union (SWANU). The latter came to represent 
predominantly the Otjiherero-speaking people 
who were directly affected by land disposses-
sion. As Tapscott (1995: 155) observed, many 
of the demands of SWAPO related instead to 
the “disadvantaged position of their constitu-
ent members”. In its early stages the movement 
campaigned for the abolition of the migrant 
labour system and the opening of the commer-
cial sector in former Owamboland to blacks.
This pattern of land dispossession formed the foundation of colonial rule and shaped what 
was known as “native policy”. Indigenous black communities’ access to land was restricted 
to “native reserves” in their different guises: bantustans, homelands and communal areas. 
However, the first stirrings of national resistance against continued South African rule in 
South West Africa in the late 1950s drove the South African government to embark on a 
reform programme that not only laid the foundation of its despised bantustan strategy, but 
also sought to strengthen and promote an incipient black middle class. It sought to bring 
about these reforms by providing the latter with access to private agricultural land in the 
communal areas. 
The first nationalist movement, being SWANU, came into existence in 1957, and SWAPO’s 
formation followed. With these developments, the South African colonial state was faced for 
the first time with “organised mass resistance to its political domination” (Innes 1980: 576). 
South Africa followed a broadly dualistic strategy in its attempts to counter opposition to 
its rule. On the one hand it sought to smash any nationalist organisation through increased 
physical repression, while on the other hand it set out to split up Namibia into a number of 
separate, tribally demarcated bantustans (ibid.). 
The broad concept for these reforms was laid out by the Commission of Enquiry into South 
West Africa Affairs (RSA 1964) appointed under the chairmanship of FH Odendaal in 1962.2 It 
was required to come up with “recommendations on a comprehensive five year plan for the 
accelerated development of the various non-White groups of SWA”, and –
… ascertain how further provisions should be made ... for their social and economic 
advancement, ... proper agricultural, industrial and mining development in respect of 
their territories and for the best form of participation by the Natives in the administration 
and management of their own interests (ibid.: 3).
2 This commission is commonly referred to as the “Odendaal Commission” after its chairman. 
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As will be discussed below, a number of socio-economic changes in terms of customary 
tenure, for example, were introduced to harness the small class of communal farmers, traders 
and teachers who increasingly perceived customary tenure as a factor that limited their 
options for accumulating more wealth. Believing that a healthy middle class might act as 
a buffer against the forces of liberation, the pre-Independence Administration was keen to 
support the development of such a middle class. 
In mid 1977 these proposals were augmented by the repeal of a range of discriminatory 
pieces of legislation including those on influx control, residential settlement and inter-racial 
sex and marriage (Tapscott 2001: 310). These changes “stripped away the barriers to Black 
social advancement which was so characteristic of the pre-Odendaal period” (Abrahams, 
1982: 22). In 1982 and 1984, national development conferences were held under the auspices 
of the then Directorate of Development Co-ordination to review development policies and 
bring them in line with the political demands of the time. With regard to future agricultural 
development, one of the long-term objectives identified by the Draft National Development 
Strategy for SWA released in the mid 1980s was to develop “a financially healthy middle 
class of agriculturalists” by transforming “‘traditional’ agriculture into ‘market oriented’ 
production” (cited in Adams and Werner 1990: 105).
The new structures of ethnically based representative authorities – a modern version of 
the old bantustans – provided opportunities for small groups of politicians, civil servants, 
teachers and nurses to earn salaries on a par with those of their white counterparts and 
vastly higher than those of the average black worker. A lack of accountability allowed for 
some individuals to enrich themselves through corrupt practices. While not condoned, this 
was tolerated by the colonial government to retain the support of second-tier authorities 
(Tapscott 2001: 310). More generally –
[as a result of the] ‘new political dispensation’, the establishment of the National 
Assembly and Ministers Council, Namibianisation of the civil service, the creation of 
eleven ethnic administration, the massive departure of skilled white workers, and the 
legal abolition of the Colour Bar in the private sector … skilled and qualified blacks 
are, for the first time in our history, able to become mobile in an upward direction 
(Abrahams 1982: 23). 
This new black elite was able to escape “from the clutches of poverty into the White man’s 
world” (ibid.). 
Despite the hardships of the liberation struggle, it created its own elite among those in exile 
and to a lesser extent those who remained in Namibia (Tapscott 2001: 314). Apart from the 
cadre of political and military leaders, those who obtained an education in exile enjoyed 
much better employment opportunities and lifestyles after Independence. These people 
came to occupy top positions in the government bureaucracy and the wider economy.
At Independence, the new SWAPO government introduced a policy of national reconciliation 
to overcome racial and class divisions it inherited. While this policy was expedient in the 
interests of forging a new national identity, it also “reinforced the status quo by protecting the 
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pre-Independence gains of the minority, by reproducing existing relations of production 
and by legitimising patterns of social differentiation that had existed in the colonial era 
(ibid.: 313).
Tapscott (ibid.: 314-315) argued that at Independence, a new elite comprising much of the 
existing elite but swelled by a new organisational elite of senior administrators, politicians 
and business people emerged in Namibia. The interests of the incoming elite coalesced to a 
large extent with the interests of the old and largely white elites. The process of developing 
a broader class identity which transcended colour was facilitated to some extent by pre-
Independence reform processes which led to a limited degree of racial integration. Elite 
formation, therefore, was not strictly along ethnic lines (Tapscott 1995: 163). The new elite 
inhabited “an economic and social world largely divorced from that of the majority of the 
urban and rural poor” (Tapscott 2001: 314). 
While enjoying political power, the new elite did not enjoy significant economic power. 
Symbolising this lack of power and economic independence was the fact that most freehold 
land was owned by whites. During the debate on the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform 
Act in 1994, a former minister and senior SWAPO MP stated the following:
We feel that as long as land remains with the white people we are not independent. 
[This] is a sentiment throughout this country for as long as you are black. You can see 
it in this House, from the time that this debate started the unanimity on this issue, not 
only in principle, but in anticipated reality. Among us blacks, there is no difference, no 
difference whatsoever (RoN, Debates of the National Assembly, 1994: 33-34).
The demand for land redistribution, in a profound way, united the new elite across ethnic 
and party-political lines. 
Policy statements on the importance of land reform for poverty alleviation not only addressed 
a real developmental problem in Namibia, but were also part of a populist agenda aimed at 
legitimising the new elite. However, there is little political pressure on the ruling party and 
government to implement a land reform programme that addresses the needs of the poor 
and dispossessed. On the one hand, the previously dispossessed remain a minority, wielding 
little political power. This helps to explain why it was relatively easy for government not to 
entertain any demands for the restoration of ancestral land to dispossessed communities. On 
the other hand, while the poor are many in number, they are not organised and hence not 
able to place any pressure on government to act. Alfred Angula, the General Secretary of 
the Namibian Farm Workers’ Union observed the following:
Land is not yet a political issue. It is not top priority for the Government. The ruling 
party is strong: SWAPO does not need the land campaign to convince people to vote for 
them … Maybe the land issue is not a top priority because every Minister has already got 
his farm. They can postpone this issue … until there is strong pressure from the poor. 
Of course the poor first have to get organised … Action may come … It is just a question 
of time (Alfred Angula in Hunter 2004: 116).
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With no organised movements to demand a more pro-poor land reform programme, gov-
ernment has considerable flexibility to implement a programme that benefits the middle 
class. 
2.3 National agrarian structure and trends
Two main factors determine agricultural production in Namibia: climate and land ownership 
(Sherbourne 2009: 74). Low and highly variable average annual rainfall limits the options 
for agricultural production. Only 8% of the country receives an average annual rainfall 
higher than 500 mm, the minimum regarded as necessary for dryland dropping. Thirty-
seven per cent receives between 300 and 500 mm annually, and the remaining 55% receives 
less than 300 mm per annum on average (Brown 1993: 91). 
In pre-colonial times, production systems were relatively well adapted to the arid conditions 
of the country. A high degree of flexibility and mobility of herds made it possible to track 
available grazing and water resources, with little risk of overgrazing. Low population 
densities facilitated such a range management system. 
The advent of formal colonialism and the large-scale land dispossession that followed in its 
wake introduced new forms of land ownership in Namibia, namely freehold title. The 
mobility and flexibility required to utilise grazing in arid to semi-arid environments gave 
way to bounded areas – settler farms – to which individual livestock herds were restricted. 
Access to these new freehold farms was reserved for whites only.
It was mentioned above that this process was highly uneven across the country. Large-
scale land dispossession affected almost exclusively indigenous livestock farmers who 
practised transhumance in the country’s arid and semi-arid central and southern areas. 
Having lost their grazing areas in central Namibia to white settlers, they were relocated 
to so-called native reserves – later called homelands, bantustans and communal areas – 
on the eastern and north-western margins of the central grazing areas. Large numbers of 
people were forced to live and farm in these reserves, which led to high densities of people 
and livestock relative to the available resources, in particular water. Individual settlers, on 
the other hand, had access to large areas of land ranging from a few thousand hectares in 
the central and northern areas to well over 10 000 ha in the arid southern regions. 
Communal areas cover approximately 41% of the country’s surface, while the freehold sector 
covers 44%. In the former communal areas, most farmers acquired access to and held land 
rights under customary tenure regimes. However, since the 1970s a wealthy and well- 
connected elite has gradually enclosed communal rangelands for their private use, largely 
without any authorisation from either traditional authorities or central government. Due 
to a neglect of these areas in terms of infrastructure development (water supply, access 
roads, extension services, etc.) as well as a high concentration of people and livestock, 
the vast majority of people in the communal areas are small-scale farmers barely able to 
satisfy their subsistence needs. Many have to complement their agricultural outputs with 
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non-agricultural income streams to make ends meet. In the freehold sector, on the other hand, 
landowners operated large-scale farms or ranches designed to breed livestock for commercial 
purposes. Generous subsidies and access to concessionary finance enabled white settler 
farmers to develop infrastructure on their farms. However, despite such subsidies, commercial 
farming is risky, and before Independence it experienced severe economic and financial strain. 
Due to the aridity of the central and southern regions of Namibia, the predominant form of 
land use is extensive livestock farming. Sixty per cent of the freehold farming area receives 
an average annual rainfall of less than 300 mm and another 35% between 300 and 500 mm. 
Only 5% receives more than 500 mm and is thus suited for rainfed cereal production (Brown 
1993: 91). As a result, approximately 14 500 000 ha of freehold land is used for extensive 
cattle ranching and 21 400 000 ha for extensive small-stock farming (Mendelsohn et al. 
2006: 42, 52). 
The primary regions for cattle farming are Khomas, Omaheke, Otjozondjupa, Kunene and 
Oshikoto. The number of cattle on freehold land increased rapidly during the first half of 
the 20th century and peaked at 2.6 million head in the late 1950s. This increase in cattle 
numbers was attributed to the development of new water points and camps in the freehold 
areas (Lange et al. 1997: 2). Since then, numbers have declined steadily to 792 897 in 2005, 
which represented about one third of the entire national cattle herd. Despite the decline in 
cattle numbers, beef production per hectare remained constant between the 1950s and the 
1990s. This, according to Lange et al. (ibid.: 12), suggests that the decline in cattle numbers 
was largely compensated for by an increase in herd productivity.
In the small-stock farming sector, after 1915 the South African Administration promoted 
farming with merino sheep in the southern regions. However, the years of drought in the 
early 1920s showed that karakul sheep were better suited than merino and Afrikaner sheep 
to the country’s arid southern landscape. The first flock of 10 karakul sheep arrived in SWA 
Maltahöhe District, Hardap – an arid region best suited to small-stock farming.
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from Germany in 1907 (Werner forthcoming). Although settler farmers initially displayed 
little interest in taking up karakul breeding, the total flock increased more than tenfold 
during the Great Depression and drought years of the late 1920s and early 1930s, from 
106 155 in 1926 to 1 125 912 in 1935 (Bravenboer 2007: 362). The gradual increase of karakul 
peaked at 4 572 794 in 1970, but declined dramatically from 1980 onwards as the market for 
pelts began to deteriorate. In 2005, the karakul herd in Namibia totalled 183 501 (ibid.). 
During the 1980s the agricultural sector came under increasing pressure. Prices for the 
country’s major agricultural commodities declined sharply. While beef prices were 762c/kg 
in 1981 (at 1990 prices), they reached a low of 513c/kg in October 1990. Lamb prices were 
also much lower in 1990 than they were in 1981 (Moll 1994: 8). 
The karakul industry was hit not only by lower prices and drought, but also by the collapse 
of the international pelt market. By the late 1980s the overproduction of mink pelts, an 
emerging recession and the negative impact of the anti-fur campaign in Europe caused 
considerable instability in the market. Coupled with increases in farm inputs, “the profit 
margin was forced to an unknown negative level”, and in a relatively short period of time, 
karakul farming “was changed into an insecure, non-profitable farming set-up” (Bravenboer 
2007: 230, 235).
Up until Independence, freehold farmers benefited from a range of direct and indirect subsidies 
as well as tax concessions. Two financial institutions provided subsidised agricultural credit: 
the Land Bank and the Agricultural Credit Board. The former lent money to freehold farmers 
with assets of more than R500 000 (R = South African Rand) at interest rates ranging 
between 7% and 10%. The Agricultural Credit Board lent money at interest rates ranging 
between 1% and 4% to farmers with assets of less than R500 000. It was estimated that in 
1990, 3 450 out of 4 000 or 86% of freehold farmers enjoyed cheap credit from one of these 
institutions (Moll 1994: 27). These credits were not available to farmers in the communal 
areas.
Apart from concessionary finance, freehold farmers also benefited from direct subsidies. 
These were typically in the form of cash for grazing relief, bush encroachment, soil 
conservation, boreholes and other items. Bodies promoting karakul and/or beef farming 
received subsidies on exports as well as a loan to the meat corporation (ibid.: 6).
However, the generous state financial support provided to white commercial farmers was 
not sufficient to stave off a crisis in the commercial farming sector. In 1982 the Representative 
Authority of the Whites commissioned consultants to investigate the profitability of farming 
in the country and make proposals on how to improve the situation (Harrison 1983). Among 
other things, they found that since circa the mid 1970s, farm profits were too low to provide 
an ‘acceptable’ standard of living. While the preceding drought was not any worse than 
before, its financial impact was far more serious due to inflation. The consultants also found 
that there were too many individual farm businesses in the country for the type of farming 
practised, and recommended that “provision should be made for the State to purchase land 
belonging to farmers whose properties are unlikely to be viable in future” (ibid.: i).
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In 1984 the SWA Agricultural Union conducted its own investigation into the financial 
position of farmers (SWALU 1985). Detailed microeconomic analyses of the assets and 
debts of commercial farmers were carried out, and these showed that although the debt 
ratio (skuldlas) of 49% of farmers was healthy, the financial situation of 23% of farmers was 
critical in 1983. Particularly critical was the position of young farmers in the age group 26 
to 35 years (ibid.: 46-47).
Independent Namibia thus inherited a commercial farming sector that was financially 
bruised. The adverse economic and climatic factors before Independence and the uncertainty 
about the future under a SWAPO government combined to “force a ‘shake-out’ in the 
cattle and sheep industries”, leading to a decrease in the number of white commercial 
farmers on the land, even though government support was still in place (Moll 1994: 8). This 
situation was compounded after Independence because most direct and indirect subsidies 
disappeared. The effect of this was that although consecutive droughts did not bring about 
a significant consolidation of farms, the number of farmers who relied on off-farm income 
increased (Lange et al. 1997: 15). Forty per cent of commercial farms were found not to be 
economically viable based on size and carrying capacity (Rawlinson 1994, quoted in ibid.: 
105).
Declining per hectare returns for commercial livestock farming since the 1970s resulted in 
debt levels of the sector increasing steadily, passing the N$1 billion mark in 1999 (Werner 
2000: 33). Commercial farmers increasingly shifted resources to non-traditional farming 
activities such as game farming, hunting and tourism regardless of whether they were 
farming with cattle or small stock (Kruger and Werner 2005: 10). The extent to which this 
has happened cannot be quantified as hardly any data has been published on the issue. 
Many farmers who used to farm with karakul responded to the collapse of the international 
karakul market by switching to mutton production. They started to farm with dorper sheep 
and goats. This, however, generated its own set of problems as meat-producing small stock 
required a greater intake of pasturage (Bravenboer 2007: 260). Overstocking became frequent 
as farmers sought to generate similar revenues from mutton production as they were able 
to generate with karakul pelt production.
In addition, the early 1990s witnessed the introduction of ostrich farming under intensive 
conditions in the southern regions (Erb 2004: 5). The fortunes of ostrich farming were 
short-lived, however, and in recent years dedicated ostrich abattoirs have been converted 
to allow for slaughtering small stock.
Post-Independence policy changes provided opportunities for farmers – commercial and 
otherwise – to engage in horticultural production in areas with sufficient water. While maize 
and wheat was produced under irrigation as well as rainfed conditions in small locations – the 
Otavi highlands and the Hardap irrigation scheme for example – Namibia remained largely 
dependent on imported fruits and vegetables. In 2004 the Agronomic Board of Namibia 
introduced the National Horticulture Development Strategy which was designed to stimulate 
the development of a sustainable horticulture sector. This strategy was complimented in 
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October 2004 by the Namibian Horticulture Market Share Promotion to increase the market 
share of local producers in local retail sales. The overall objectives of this initiative were to 
increase food self-sufficiency, substitute imports and create employment (Sherbourne 2009: 
82). 
In a related development, government embarked on a large-scale irrigation initiative called 
the Green Scheme in August 2003. The scheme entails increasing the area under irrigation 
from 8 600 ha to 27 000 ha and creating 10 000 permanent and 34 800 part-time jobs over 
a 15-year period. The model is based on a private-public partnership designed to stimulate 
investment in the sector (ibid.: 84). Green Scheme projects are envisaged to consist of a core 
large-scale farmer who is obliged to provide technical and marketing support to a limited 
number of small-scale irrigation farmers.
The importance of the agricultural sector to the national economy has decreased steadily 
since the 1970s. While the sector contributed 16.1% to GDP in 1976, this declined to 8.7% in 
1981 (Harrison 1983: 2). A year after Independence it stood at just below 9%, but since 2000 
its contribution has exceeded 6% only in 2006 and 2007. On average about one third 
of agriculture’s contribution to GDP emanates from the communal areas. Real growth in 
the agricultural sector stood at 1.7% from 1995 to 2007 compared to 4.1% for the national 
economy as a whole (Sherbourne 2009: 73-74). However, the sector remains very important 
in terms of its forward and backward linkages, and particularly in terms of the number of 
people it provides with subsistence of one kind or another.
The structure and transformation of commercial farming on freehold land has presented 
the MLR with challenges and opportunities. As will be shown in section 2.5 below, the 
dominant model for resettlement is based on extensive small-scale commercial livestock 
farming. Land on offer is assessed with criteria in mind that facilitate the implementation 
of this model. Land suitable for game or tourism farming and small-scale irrigation has not 
been considered for acquisition to date, as no models exist in terms of which beneficiaries 
could be supported. This is clearly limiting the amount of land that can be considered 
suitable for resettlement. Also it helps one to understand the MLR’s constant complaint that 
it does not receive enough offers of suitable land.
Land prepared for cultivation at Westfalen, Hardap. successful maize cultivation at Westfalen.
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2.4 Land reform and rural development policies
Land reform is poorly integrated into wider development policies and programmes in 
Namibia. It remains a sectoral responsibility aimed at addressing imbalances in freehold 
land ownership and enhancing “the welfare of the people through improved productivity” 
(RoN 2008: 114). 
To start with, Namibia still does not have a rural development policy. The NDP3 states 
that during 2006 the Ministry of Regional and Local Government, Housing and Rural 
Development “embarked on a participatory, multi-sectoral approach of consultations” in 
all 13 regions as part of the preparations for a rural development policy. Significantly, the 
key challenges identified do not include access to land or any other land-related issues, but 
instead, “lack of access to quality public services such as education, health, water, roads and 
agricultural extension services”. The consultations also suggested that it was appropriate 
to update and streamline a number of sub-sector policies developed after Independence. 
As a result, the National Agriculture Policy and the National Drought Policy were updated 
(ibid.: 196-197).
2.5 Farm planning and ‘viability’
Any assessment of the impact which access to land has had on poverty reduction among 
those with few assets has to be carried out against the background of Namibia’s models for 
resettlement. Underlying the national resettlement approach are two basic models: 
 z group farming; and
 z small-scale commercial farming.
The AALS model is not discussed in this context as it does not target asset-poor people. 
2.5.1  group farms
The National Resettlement Policy provides for two models of group resettlement (MLRR 
2001a: 7):
 z group holdings; and
 z co-operative holdings and other legal entities.
The first model caters for a formal or non-formal group composed of people who cannot 
form a co-operative but are interested in engaging in agricultural or other production as 
a group. The second model caters for duly registered co-operatives or other legal entities 
such as companies and close corporations. The rationale for the latter model is “to facilitate 
the smooth functioning of the co-operative type of resettlement project and to monitor and 
control the use of financial input made by the Government” (ibid.). For most of the post-
Independence period, group resettlement has been referred to as “co-operative resettlement”, 
but this description has gradually disappeared.
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Officially the MLR runs 14 group resettlement projects across the country. Half of these are 
located in communal areas and the other half in the commercial or freehold sector. Group 
resettlement projects were launched in haste after Independence (MLRR 1996: 19; Suzman 
2001: 90-91). This reflected the need to accommodate large numbers of exiles who had no 
shelter, employment or other income. Topping the list of potential beneficiaries ahead of 
ex-soldiers in the National Resettlement Policy are members of the San community. The 
reason for this prioritisation was as follows:
[The San] have endured exploitation and discrimination at the hands of their fellow 
citizens throughout history. This includes the exploitation by colonial forces who used 
them as trackers and later left them helpless in former military camps. At present the 
San people are in the hands of farmers in both the communal and commercial areas 
as well as other sorts of employers where they are marginalised and subjected to unfair 
labour practices. These people have suffered tremendously as a result of historical changes 
caused by the political constellations and ecological constraints. Therefore, they need 
to be helped in realising a new living by developing existing skills and acquiring new 
ones to be able to secure their sustenance (MLRR 2001a: 3-4).
Many former San soldiers who were employed by the South African military were literally 
abandoned and left to their own devices at Independence. They were then accommodated 
in group resettlement projects mainly in the north-eastern communal areas.
A consequence of the haste with which group resettlement projects were established was 
that little planning went into the process. The basic concept underlying the approach was 
that beneficiaries were to engage in dry-land crop farming for own consumption, combined 
with other small income-generating activities to “make them self-sufficient in the long term” 
(MLRR 1996: 19). These included brickmaking, small bakeries and sewing activities. Some 
group schemes were assisted with the procurement of farm implements and provision of 
drinking water, irrigation equipment, materials and supplies, seed, fertiliser and pesticides. 
The policy was for government to support “the poorest section of beneficiaries for the first 
five year period, [whereafter] they were expected to be trained and properly equipped to 
become self-reliant” (The Land, 1(1), 1998). 
For most group resettlement schemes, no selection of settlers took place. An assessment of 
group schemes in 2000 found the following:
[Beneficiaries] simply found themselves in so-called ‘co-operative’ projects, and were 
instructed by government officials to work collectively on certain activities. Rather than 
moving towards self-reliance and independence, nearly all beneficiaries exhibit(ed) 
attitudes of dependency towards the projects (Werner and Vigne 2000: 30).
Group resettlement schemes were essentially “social welfare projects providing free accom-
modation, food and other transfers” and showing “few signs of being resettlement projects 
as commonly understood” (ibid. 2000: 32; Meliczek 2008: 10). The National Resettlement 
Policy states that beneficiaries should be self-reliant and self-sufficient by the fourth year, 
but the MLR continues to provide regular budgetary support to official group resettlement 
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projects. This is meant to be spent on preparing land for crop production, clearing land, 
irrigating, drilling boreholes, purchasing fencing materials and constructing houses. The 
MLR has not set a cutoff date for providing such support (Meliczek 2008: 11). 
Ongoing government support to group resettlement schemes has probably contributed to 
the fact that these schemes have not recorded significant dropout rates. To the contrary, 
many of these schemes, including Drimiopsis and Skoonheid (two of the LaLR study sites 
in Omaheke Region), have attracted outsiders in the form of illegal settlers and informal 
settlements (ibid.: 10).
Since most group resettlement schemes continue to be dependent on government financial 
support, a rethink on group schemes has taken place in the MLR and the Ministry is no 
longer promoting them (ibid.: 12).
2.5.2  small-scale commercial farms
Currently, small-scale commercial farming or the Farm Unit Resettlement Scheme (FURS) 
is the most prominent component of redistributive land reform. This model entails acquiring 
and subdividing large-scale commercial farms, and allocating portions or units to individual 
beneficiaries according to allocation plans developed by land use planners in the MLR. The 
Land Reform Advisory Commission has recommended that the units allocated should not 
be smaller than 1 000 ha in Namibia’s northern regions where rainfall is higher, and not 
smaller than 3 000 ha in the more arid south comprising Hardap and Karas Regions. To 
qualify for resettlement, beneficiaries may not have more than 150 large-stock units (LSU) 
or the small-stock equivalent thereof. In 2004 the average sizes of the units allocated to 
FURS farmers were 2 138 ha in the southern half of the country and 1 200 ha in the more 
fertile northern regions (PTT 2005b: 40).
cattle farming in arid Hardap. cattle farming in more fertile Omaheke.
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The Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act (ACLRA) of 1995 provides for the granting 
of 99-year leasehold rights to allocated farming units and subsequent registration of the 
lease agreements in the Deeds Office. In terms of this Act, leasehold rights are circumscribed 
in so far as any actions that may in any way encumber a farming unit allocated by the MLR, 
such as rights to assign, sublet or mortgage, are subject to the Minister’s written approval. 
However, in a legal opinion the Office of the Attorney-General expressed the view that a 
mortgage could be registered on any lease agreement registered in the Deeds Office.
2.6 viability
Land reform in Namibia faces the challenge of maximising the number of people benefiting 
from land redistribution without threatening the viability and sustainability of the land 
reform programme, and with it the livelihoods of the people settled. However, the notion of 
‘viability’ is contested. As will be shown, the dominant views on what is viable and not viable 
are informed by a narrow business perspective. This is not to say that such a perspective is 
not important. Part of the reason for the continued currency of this particular discourse is 
that it makes sense to many farmers who run their farms as businesses. But, as this report 
will show, for many land reform beneficiaries, the definition of viability is much broader; it 
also encompasses tenure security and hence the right to take their own decisions on their 
own livelihoods. 
This section will provide a brief history of the discourse on viability.
The prevailing resettlement model and farm planning criteria are rooted in a discourse 
on agricultural development of communal areas that was started in the 1960s. As in other 
countries in Southern Africa, notions of viability and the approaches to farm planning that 
followed from those have been based on a “modernisation narrative” (Cousins and Scoones 
2009: 2). Underlying this narrative was the colonial government’s desire to create a middle 
class of farmers, arguably as a bulwark against the rising tide of national liberation.
As discussed above, the Odendaal Commission (RSA 1964) was tasked in the early 1960s to 
propose a reform model for Namibia. Underlying the Commission’s thinking was a linear 
development model. It argued that the first aim of economic development had been achieved 
in SWA, this being the establishment of “a modern economy in the Southern Sector by the 
White group” and concomitant “selective transformation” of the “traditional socio-cultural 
background” of indigenous communities. It saw SWA to be on the verge of a second phase 
of economic development, “namely where non-White groups have increasingly to be given 
the opportunity, necessary assistance and encouragement to find an outlet for their new 
experience and capabilities” (ibid.: 429). The Commission characterised this process as the 
transition from a subsistence economy to a money economy, whereby “the traditional system 
of supplying their own needs and of self-support was gradually supplanted by a money 
system peculiar to the system of the Whites” (ibid.: 425). Future development programmes in 
Namibia had to build on these tendencies by “consolidat[ing], expand[ing] and convert[ing]” 
existing reserves into homelands “in which groups concerned could develop their own viable 
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economy” (ibid.: 429). Economic activities had to be brought to the reserve areas through 
a “broad programme of capital expenditure [in which] the various population groups can 
participate [without] disrupting their existing strong traditional family and homeland ties” 
(cited in Innes 1980: 577).
It followed from these basic assumptions that agriculture in the communal areas had to be 
“modernised”. More specifically:
[The Commission] consider[ed] the development of animal husbandry in all its branches 
to be vitally important to the inhabitants of these areas. In this development the efficient 
marketing of livestock and of meat is a decisive factor ... (RSA 1964: 277).
As far as the Commission was concerned, the improvement of livestock husbandry was 
primarily a matter of improving animal health and the quality of breeding stock. 
Although the Odendaal Commission was “much more an intervention into politics than 
agricultural production per se ...” (Pankhurst 1996: 418), its proposals on agricultural devel-
opment were taken up and operationalised in the Five Year Plan for the Development of the 
Native Areas (hereafter “5-Year Plan”, SWA [1966]) in the mid 1960s. This plan recommended 
specific interventions for improving agricultural production in the communal areas. The 
underlying assumption guiding its deliberations was that “agricultural planning must ... pave 
the way in converting an existing subsistence economy to an exchange economy” (ibid.: 94). 
The basis for “scientific agricultural planning” (ibid.) hinged on two main elements:
 z the classification of communal areas into agro-ecological zones in order to capture the 
ecological characteristics of each area; and 
 z an “assessment of the carrying capacity of the grazing and the determination of the size 
of economic farming units” in order to estimate the “ultimate human carrying capacity 
for the region to be planned (ibid.: 95).
“Scientific agricultural planning” had to be complemented by an agricultural extension 
programme “based on transforming the traditional subsistence farming pattern into one 
conforming to the requirements of a market economy” (ibid.). Extension work should be 
aimed at improving livestock production, more specifically at controlling disease “and to 
provide the necessary amenities for rational livestock farming” (ibid.: 97). The 5-Year Plan 
also proposed the establishment of training and research projects to support the process 
of “modernising” agriculture.
Recommendations of the 5-Year Plan for the modernisation of agriculture and thus the 
transition from subsistence to commercial farming included proposals on transforming 
customary land tenure systems into more individualised land tenure. For the predominantly 
Otjiherero-speaking communal areas, for example, it recommended “a large scale fencing 
programme”. Here, argued the 5-Year Plan, “proper pasture rotation” was “a prerequisite 
for optimal utilisation of available resources” and could only be achieved through enclosure:
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With the erection of fences, grazing camps can be given the necessary rest periods 
during certain times of the year and thus offer more abundant and better grazing to 
animals (ibid.: 163).
Although similar recommendations for fencing communal land were not made for all of the 
communal areas, this particular approach to improving range management and animal 
husbandry, i.e. the privatisation of communal rangelands by way of fencing, became firmly 
embedded in agricultural planning in communal areas generally. Native Affairs officials soon 
promoted the individualisation of customary rangeland tenure through the introduction of 
fencing in other communal areas. The Chief Agricultural Officer in Ondangwa argued in 
1969 that “fencing and water will be needed to promote sound veld and stock management 
practices.”3 A year later, a sub-committee of the “Planning and Co-ordinating Committee” 
submitted that “the present system of land ownership and utilisation had a limiting influence 
on the administration (extension) and production (lack of continuity) as economic asset 
[sic]”.4 
The concept of “economic units” became a popular tool in the process of transforming 
customary land tenure on a “healthy and economic basis”.5 Translated into current 
development jargon, this statement expressed the assumption that economic units were 
a precondition for sustainable agricultural development. The concept became firmly 
embedded in agricultural planning in subsequent decades. In the mid 1980s, participants 
in a Development Conference held in Windhoek were told that economic units needed to 
be defined primarily on the basis of livestock farming, and any additional contributions 
from rainfed cultivation, dairying or other intensive farming activities should be regarded 
as bonuses. The carrying capacity of different agro-ecological regions would ensure that 
overstocking would not take place. Criteria to determine economic units should be the 
same throughout the country, even where communal land was surveyed (SWA/Namibia 
1984: 171). 
These proposed changes sought to bring agricultural planning and development in line 
with the wider reform process of the 1980s which, among other things, abolished formal 
racial discrimination measures. Until then, different criteria were applied to planning in 
communal areas and the white freehold sector. The first documented attempts to define 
economic units in communal areas date back to 1971 when it was recommended that the 
size of an economic unit in former Owamboland should support 100 LSU or 400 small-
stock units (SSU).6 This recommendation was approved by the so-called Owambo Cabinet 
– a homeland institution – and applied to farm planning. By contrast, the minimum size 
of an economic unit for white farmers had to support at least 400 LSU or 2 000 SSU at the 
official carrying capacity (Administration for Whites 1987). 
3  (OVA), 49, 6/9/1, Hooflandboubeampte Ondangua: Insake vraelys, 25 June 1969, p.4.
4 OVA, 49, 6/8/4/1, Vergadering van die Onderkomitee oor Dorpsbeplanning en ontwikkeling en Land-
bouontwikkeling van die Beplannings- en Koordinerende Komitee op Woensdag 2 September 1970, p.2
5 OVA, 49, 6/10/2-7(I), Die Sekretaris (no date, no title), p.13.
6 OVA 49, 6/10/2-7 (II), Sekretaris Departement van Landbou en Bosbou to Sekretaris van die Hoofminister, 
Ondangua, 2.7.1973, p.2
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Before Independence, proposals to develop private farms on communal land corresponding 
to economic units resonated well with a small but growing black middle class, who regarded 
this as a means to obtain the equivalent of a large-scale commercial farm in the communal 
areas – free of charge. This middle class was able to articulate its interests in the applicable 
ethnically based Representative Authorities – modified versions of bantustans. Ethnic 
politicians used their bantustan political platforms to exhort the virtues of privatising 
communal land in the interests of improved agricultural output and healthier pastures. 
One variant of the agricultural model first expounded by the 5-Year Plan proposed for 
communal areas in the south was that farms of 8 000 ha should be subdivided into 2 000 ha 
units. These were to be allocated to communal farmers owning 400 or less small stock. As 
the latter built up their herds, they would be allocated another 2 000 ha up to a maximum 
of 8 000 ha. Those who did not succeed would be persuaded to leave subsistence farming 
and work in a different sector. At a size of 8 000 ha, approximately 270 farms could have 
been developed in the Nama communal area. A lack of funds prevented the Representative 
Authority of the Nama from implementing these proposals (Adams and Werner 1990: 105).
In the Otjiherero-speaking communal areas, the size of economic units was linked to 
expected annual incomes. Individual fenced farms on communal land had to be big enough 
to provide their beneficiaries with an annual income of R20 000 to R25 000 in the 1980s. 
This would have required about 350 head of large stock, and at a carrying capacity of about 
12 ha/LSU and a stocking rate of 85%, the minimum farm size should have been 4 900 ha 
(ibid.: 106). Sixty farms measuring 5 000 ha were surveyed for individual farmers in the 
Herero communal areas. 
Before long, Herero and Nama ethnic politicians criticised the sizes of economic units at 
5 000 ha and 4 000 ha respectively as being too small. Realising that the existing communal 
areas were not able to satisfy their demands for large farms, they argued that whites should 
be forced to make some of their land available (ibid.: 107).
The perceived need to transform communal agriculture and to gradually replace customary 
tenure with individualised fenced units also received support from rangeland managers 
who subscribed to the “tragedy of the commons” thesis. The last pre-Independence “Minister 
of Agriculture”, for example, stated at the 24th Congress of the Grassland Society of Southern 
Africa in 1989 that land degradation was common in communal areas. Without producing 
any evidence, he ascribed this perception to the fact that customary tenure systems did not 
make provision for any form of initiative, did not provide for private ownership and made 
the optimal utilisation and conservation of the land impossible (cited in Werner 1994: 30). 
The ideal solution to this problem “would be to break up the whole communal system into 
economical units which [are] operated on a purely commercial basis” (ibid.).
This particular discourse on the perceived shortcomings of customary tenure survived well 
into independent Namibia and was perpetuated by senior government ministers. Freehold 
and customary tenure were now characterised as “first and second class systems of land 
tenure” (Hamutenya 1997: 32). This categorisation was taken over by the National Land 
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Policy (RoN 1998: 1). What defined second-class tenure was that people holding customary 
land rights were not able to use their land as collateral for credit. Consequently, they were 
unable to develop economically. Moreover, because the second-class tenure system did 
not provide for ownership of land, land degradation due to overgrazing and overcropping 
ensued. And finally, little investment was taking place particularly in newly created towns 
in communal areas because of the absence of private ownership (Iivula-Ithana 1997: 12). 
According to the then Minister of Trade and Industry, Hidipo Hamutenya, government had 
three basic options at Independence for dealing with the existence of first- and second-class 
systems of tenure, i.e. freehold and customary tenure. The options were (Hamutenya 1997: 32):
 z nationalising freehold land for redistribution;
 z completing the process of alienating and privatising all communal land; and
 z continuing with the status quo. 
Each of these options had far-reaching implications. Nationalisation might have resulted in 
the destabilisation of the agricultural sector with a resultant loss of employment opportunities. 
Turning communal areas into private property would have placed most communal land “into 
the hands of a small elite of white and black landlords”, creating large-scale landlessness and 
destitution. For these reasons, government opted for the third option, “at least temporarily 
and then to introduce a process of gradual reform of that system” (ibid.). The role of the 
state was to lay “the foundation and framework upon which private economic activities can 
flourish” (Angula 1997: 51). 
The continuity in thinking about viability was possible because there were no alternative 
models put forward by small-scale communal farmers and landless people. A number of 
different resettlement and redistribution options with their respective financial costs and 
likely impact on equity were prepared for the National Conference on Land Reform and the 
Land Question in 1991 (Purcell 1991), but these were not properly discussed at the conference 
and have not been discussed since. Instead, the conference resolved, inter alia, that government 
should appoint a technical committee on commercial farmland to evaluate facts and infor-
mation regarding unutilised land, land held by absentee owners, land tax and viable farm 
sizes in different regions. While this exercise was valuable in itself, it also transformed the 
political question of land redistribution into a technical one, arguably giving government 
more time to develop a land reform programme.
This Technical Committee on Commercial Farmland was duly appointed, and it submitted a 
report in 1992. The report conveyed the different options developed for the Land Conference 
but without a critical assessment of their appropriateness. Consequently, the committee did 
not make any recommendation on any of the options. The only recommendations it made in 
this regard referred to farm sizes for individual beneficiaries: in cases where people bought 
their own farms, they should not have been smaller than 4 000 ha, but could have ranged 
from 2 000 ha to 3 000 ha where people made use of subsidies to buy land. Where the 
state acquired land and resettled beneficiaries, minimum farm sizes should not be less than 
1 500 ha (Office of the Prime Minister 1992: 180). 
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In order to complement land redistribution in the freehold sector, government pursued the 
idea of identifying so-called unutilised communal land with a view to surveying small-
scale commercial farms and allocating them to previously disadvantaged Namibians. The 
consultants hired by the MLR to carry out this investigation included planners who served in 
managerial positions in the pre-Independence Department of Development Co-ordination in 
the 1980s which published several tomes on (agricultural) development in pre-Independence 
Namibia, espousing the virtues of economic units as a means to promote the development of a 
middle class. It is therefore no coincidence that the model for developing communal land into 
small-scale commercial farming units is identical to those first developed by the 5-Year Plan.
This discourse on communal land and customary tenure had an impact on land reform in 
the communal areas. On the one hand, a number of wealthy and politically well-connected 
people fenced off communal land for individual use without proper authorisation by the 
state, thereby continuing a process that had started before Independence. The extent of 
privatisation is not clear, but that it has impacted negatively on transhumance patterns in 
some communal areas has been documented (Cox et al. 1998).
The discourse on agricultural planning and development just discussed also found its way 
into the National Agricultural Policy of 1995 and the National Land Policy of 1996. The 
former stated that the subdivision of agricultural land would be permitted only if, inter alia, 
“appropriate provision is made for the maintenance of farming units of an economically 
viable size and the long term sustainability of natural resources and agricultural production 
on the land” (RoN 1995: 35). This principle was incorporated into the National Land Policy 
which stated that the subdivision of large-scale farming units should be conditional on the 
“maintenance of farming units of an economically viable size” (MLRR 1998a: 16). 
Section A ● 2. Land Reform and Poverty: National Policy Context
Farm plan for Tulpvlei resettlement farm in Hardap.
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The determination of a viable unit size for small-scale farming under the land reform 
programme was left to the Land Reform Advisory Commission (LRAC) established in terms 
of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act. The LRAC is composed of stakeholders in 
various sectors and line ministries. On the face of it, leaving the determination of minimum 
farm sizes to the LRAC reflected an acknowledgement that the determination of minimum 
income levels to be obtained from farming units is not simply a matter of economics. 
To be sure, “there is a cut-off point below which a piece of land cannot be farmed on an 
economically viable basis”, but “any size above this absolute minimum depends on the 
income expectations people have”. “Economic units” therefore had to be negotiated by all 
stakeholders (PTT 2005b: 22).
Little is known about how the LRAC arrived at the economic units that form the basis of 
resettlement, but it is known that a sub-committee of this body was tasked to come up 
with scale models for large- and small-stock farming, agronomic farming ventures, dual-
purpose farming ventures, small-scale irrigation, and broiler and pig production (MLRR 
1998b). 
The sub-committee assumed that the cost of living of beneficiaries of land reform would be 
in the region of N$15 000 per annum in 1998. This figure was based on statistics obtained 
from the National Planning Commission which suggested that the “minimum cost of living 
to ensure a decent livelihood” was N$12 442 per annum for an average family size of 5.7 
persons (ibid.: 18). On the basis of this projected income, the sub-committee calculated 
cash flow projections for different farm unit sizes using the profit margin method (ibid.: 19). 
The MLR has increased the minimum projected income to be achieved by beneficiaries to 
N$28 000.
It is not clear to what extent these calculations informed the LRAC recommendation to 
allocate units no smaller than 1 000 ha in the northern regions and no smaller than 3 000 ha 
in the southern regions. This is so particularly in view of the sub-committee having shown that 
a beneficiary would have only a small surplus of N$1 650 p.a. on a 1 780 ha unit in an area 
with a carrying capacity of 1 LSU per 10 ha, farming with 178 LSU, of which approximately 
50% would have been breeding stock (ibid.: 23). This suggests that a unit smaller than 1 780 ha 
would not have shown positive cash flows and an annual income of N$15 000.
The issue of ‘appropriate economic units’ for beneficiaries remains contested. While the 
MLR has settled for a relatively small farm size, organised agriculture favours large-scale 
farms. This reflects a perception shared by a substantial number of both black and white 
Namibians, that small-scale farming is not economically and financially viable. A Cabinet 
Minister put this very bluntly in stating that he could not see resettlement farms succeeding 
as they were too small: “… the previous owner of the farm could only survive on that farm 
because he or she was the only farmer, so that, particularly in dry years, they could rotate 
their animals” (von Wietersheim 2008: 166).
Underlying definitions of economic units have been narrow conceptions of what is viable 
and not viable. Viability has been assessed exclusively in terms of financial benefits. The 
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Namibia Agricultural Union (NAU) summarised this succinctly in arguing that farming is 
a business like any other in the economy, so resettlement farms should also be viewed as 
businesses. Consistent with this argument, the NAU proposed using the criteria of medium-
size enterprises as a benchmark for setting the minimum sizes of resettle ment farm units. 
A medium-size enterprise (excluding manufacturing) is defined as having an annual 
turnover of N$1 million, no more than 10 employees, and annual working capital of less 
than N$500 000 (NAU 2003: 54). 
More recently the NAU recommended, firstly, that 500 LSU be regarded as an operational 
unit, hence as viable. This requires farm sizes ranging from 5 000 ha in the best grazing 
areas to 8 000 ha in more arid areas. Secondly, only farmers owning more than two 
operational units (i.e. 10 000 ha to 16 000 ha) should be encouraged to offer their land for 
redistribution (NAU 2005: 9). 
The MLR continues to use a small-scale farming model based primarily on livestock 
farming to assess land for acquisition. A criterion recommended by the LRAC for assessing 
the suitability of land for resettlement is that a piece of land must be able to support at 
least 80 LSU or 500 SSU, assuming that the appropriate infrastructure is in place and in 
working order. The potential of a piece of land to support cropping is determined by its 
growing period.7 Under the best possible farming conditions, these criteria should enable 
beneficiaries to exceed the minimum annual income by a handsome margin, depending on 
where they were settled. 
Confining the approach to resettlement to such a narrow model has led to several problems. 
The most publicised problem is that the MLR does not receive enough land “suitable for 
resettlement”. This is attributable to several factors, an important one being the narrow set 
of criteria used to select land for resettlement. Many small portions of irrigation land, for 
example, are waived because they are not regarded as suitable for resettlement. Similarly, 
smallholdings close to urban areas are waived as there is no appropriate model to support 
beneficiaries pursuing intensive agriculture. 
In addition, the current approach leaves little room for beneficiaries to articulate their 
needs and preferences regarding their livelihood. It is an approach based on farms and 
not on people. This LaLR study has shown that many applicants for resettlement do not 
necessarily want a piece of land large enough to farm commercially. The main priority of a 
great many of them was to obtain access to land on which to establish a secure home 
of their own. But the absence of alternative resettlement models left them with no option 
other than to apply for a small-scale farm, and if successful, to obtain access to a piece 
of land exceeding 1 000 ha which they never had any intention of farming except on a 
household subsistence level.
In many instances, the size of the unit allocated to beneficiaries did not match with their 
productive assets such as livestock numbers. Consequently, beneficiaries were not able 
7 Growing period is defined as the period during which the precipitation, i.e. rainfall, exceeds half of the 
potential evapotranspiration (Huesken et al 1994: 4). 
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to utilise all of their land, and large tracts were underutilised. In 2004 the PTT found that 
many resettlement farms were underutilised because beneficiaries did not have enough 
assets, particularly livestock.
It is a moot point whether beneficiaries whose livestock numbers are too low to use their 
land allocations fully would be able to become successful small-scale commercial farmers 
as the resettlement model envisages. Indications are that even with optimum numbers of 
livestock, beneficiaries would find it impossible to generate enough revenue from their land 
to sustain themselves as well as cover the costs of asset depreciation and replacement.
Schuh et al (2006) have provided detailed financial and economic calculations which 
show that under optimal management and pasture conditions, small-scale resettlement 
farmers can generate incomes on their allocated units. However, these are very small. A 
rough calculation of gross margins based on the Maximum Income Derivation calculations 
provided in the “Draft Resettlement Manual” (MLR 2008) not only supports this view but 
also shows that gross margins for a 3 000 ha unit in the south are much higher than for a 
1 000 ha unit in the central and eastern regions.
The “Draft Resettlement Manual” assumes a cattle herd of 150 head in its calculations. 
However, the optimum stocking rate on a 1 000 ha unit with a carrying capacity of 1 LSU 
per 15 ha should be no more than 67 head. The second assumption that was changed related 
to running costs. The “Draft Resettlement Manual” assumes these to be 60% of turnover. In 
view of the fact that resettlement beneficiaries are placed on developed farm units, these costs 
have been revised downwards to 40%. Based on these assumptions, and using the formula 
used by the MLR, the following picture emerges regarding farm turnover and income:
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Gross annual incomes for small-stock farming depend on whether beneficiaries are farming 
with sheep or goats. For current purposes, no distinction is made between these two forms 
of production, but the gross margins are very different. For the small-stock sector, as for cattle 
farming, similar adjustments to the Maximum Income Derivation in the “Draft Resettlement 
Manual” have been made. A stocking rate of 1 SSU per 5 ha was assumed, and the results 
are presented in Table 4.
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These gross margins do not include depreciation and investments. Furthermore, they are 
based on most favourable conditions, which hardly ever exist in agriculture. If the costs of 
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capital investments and replacements are considered, it becomes clear that a gross margin 
of N$37 500 leaves very little surplus for household subsistence and investments on the 
farm. Moreover, this gross margin can only be achieved if the allocation is utilised fully. 
This implies that there is no spare grazing for drought years. The smaller farms are in 
arid environments, so they are the most vulnerable to drought. Due to their small sizes, 
they offer very limited opportunities to farmers to apply flexible farming practices. The 
expected impact of climate change on the arid and semi-arid parts of the world will further 
compound this problem.
Apart from raising doubts about the economic and financial sustainability of resettlement 
units as small-scale commercial farms, the figures also suggest dramatic inherent inequalities 
in land allocations in the central and southern regions. Tables 3 and 4 show that annual 
net incomes on cattle farms are substantially lower at N$37 500 than those on small-stock 
farms at N$77 070. Beneficiaries settled on 3 000 ha in the south are able to keep 30% more 
livestock on their land than cattle farmers. Cattle farmers can keep a maximum of 67 LSU 
on a 1 000 ha farm at a stocking rate of 15 ha per LSU compared to 100 LSU in the south, 
if 600 SSU are converted to LSU. In many cattle farming areas, bush encroachment has 
contributed to the relatively low carrying capacity.
The current small-scale resettlement model is only likely to yield moderate levels of success 
if beneficiaries can satisfy the following requirements (GFA 2003: 14):
 z Beneficiaries must either own enough livestock or have the financial means to acquire 
some to use their land fully.
 z Unless beneficiaries have sufficiently large herds to utilise the unit fully, they must have 
access to off-farm income or other capital to finance their cash needs before the production 
system starts to produce a surplus.
 z Beneficiaries should have experience or at least the potential ability to manage medium-
size enterprises (such as a 1 000 ha farm).
This research has found that only a few resettlement beneficiaries satisfy these requirements, 
which suggests that there is a mismatch between the prevailing resettlement model and 
the knowledge and asset base of beneficiaries. Without access to other, non-agricultural 
income streams, beneficiaries find it difficult to survive.
This mismatch appears to have brought about a change which von Wietersheim (2008: 120) 
characterised as a “clear shift from political to economic objectives”. Many senior policy 
and decision makers no longer regard land reform as necessary to solve the country’s 
poverty problems (Prime Minister N. Angula in ibid.: 160). Instead, resettlement should 
concentrate on the middle class and assist them to become full-scale commercial farmers. 
Borrowing from a modernisation discourse, this process was perceived by some as a smooth 
linear progression. In 2002, the then Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation and 
current President of Namibia stated that resettlement land should “serve as a place where 
some future potential commercial farmers should graduate from and be able to acquire 
their own agricultural land” (MLRR 2002: 3). This view was reiterated recently by another 
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Cabinet Minister who argued that the beginner or weaker farmers “should first start in the 
communal area, establish themselves there, and then qualify for resettlement”. Middle-class 
or aspirant farmers were left in-between weaker communal farmers and those who qualified 
for an AALS loan. They did not want to farm in the communal areas and did not have the 
means to buy a farm. “Therefore, a resettlement farm should be a place of empowerment, 
where somebody is put, not for 99 years but for a number of years, to establish himself and 
then become commercial” (Minister W. Konjore in von Wietersheim 2008: 166). This line 
of reasoning entails that resettlement farms provide the middle class with a cheap means to 
accumulate capital.
One must conclude that redistributive land reform is constrained by a resettlement model 
that focuses very narrowly on extensive livestock farming. For most of the land targeted 
for redistribution, this is the only sustainable land use option, and indeed it is likely to benefit 
those who want to farm with livestock. However, there are many poor Namibians who will 
not be served by this model because they do not want land primarily for farming purposes. 
In other cases, planners in the MLR are waiving small parcels of irrigation land and larger 
game farms as the dominant resettlement model is not geared to crop and game farming.
Little debate has taken place on additional options for resettlement and livelihoods on 
redistributed land. The PTT (2005a: 29) recommended that resettlement models be developed 
that encourage beneficiaries to co-operate and accept joint responsibility for shared resources. 
Another possible model, entailing the purchase of commercial farms for communal area 
expansion, was rejected at a land reform workshop in 2001. According to Adams (2001: 2), 
an official in the MLRR said that “communal area expansion [is] unacceptable as a policy 
option”. However, if the point of departure for successful land reform is improved livelihoods 
for the poor, resettlement models proposed in the past may need to be revisited with a view 
to developing additional models.
Apart from these concerns, the small-scale commercial farming model which was adopted 
for resettlement needs to be reviewed to establish whether it will achieve the formal and 
perceived objectives of land reform in its current form. For one thing, the model in its 
current form is not likely to be economically and financially sustainable as allocated units 
are too small to generate sufficient income to sustain beneficiaries and finance depreciation 
and capital investment costs. To the extent that this is true, beneficiaries will continue to 
depend on financial inputs from the MLR to maintain and replace essential infrastructure. 
Apart from not generating sufficient revenues, the sizes of resettlement units make it 
impossible for beneficiaries to ‘graduate’ from resettlement to an AALS loan. The minimum 
requirement for an AALS loan is 150 LSU, which is double the livestock number that a 
beneficiary is able to keep on the minimum farm sizes allocated in the central and northern 
regions, and 50% more than can be kept in the southern regions. 
The final point on the current resettlement model is that it contains inherent inequalities. 
The minimum unit sizes in the south make it possible for beneficiaries to keep 40% more 
livestock than is possible on the minimum allocations in the central and northern regions. 
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2.7 Beneficiary selection criteria
The selection of beneficiaries is a serious bone of contention in the land reform programme. 
The root cause of this contention is that the criteria for selecting beneficiaries do not include 
any income-related criteria, which has resulted in well-off people such as Permanent 
Secretaries, Governors and senior civil servants benefiting from the programme. 
The National Resettlement Policy sets out three broad categories of potential beneficiaries 
which are defined by different asset bases: (1) people with no land, no livestock and no 
employment; (2) people with no land and no income but some livestock; and (3) people with 
income and livestock but no land. In addition, specific target groups were identified for 
resettlement: members of the San community; ex-soldiers; displaced, destitute and landless 
Namibians; people with disabilities; and people from overcrowded communal areas (RoN 
2001: 3-5). The National Resettlement Policy also lays down other criteria, including: having 
a background and interest in agriculture or other related activities on resettlement farms; and 
being prepared to hold the allocated land under leasehold and to adhere to the stipulations 
of the lease agreement under threat of eviction in case of transgression (ibid.: 5).
These criteria are so broad that it has proved difficult to apply them in a transparent and 
consistent manner across the country. They are wide enough to give Regional Resettlement 
Committees (RRCs) considerable space to recommend people who are not necessarily in 
need of land. This led to land being allocated to people who might have been previously 
disadvantaged, but who have more than made up for that since Independence by, inter 
alia, being appointed to well-remunerated government and parastatal posts. The current 
Governor of Omaheke Region, for example, has benefited from the resettlement programme, 
as have the Deputy Director of Land Use Planning in the MLR and other government officials. 
Beneficiaries of Bernafey group resettlement scheme in Hardap.
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Moreover, while 80% of beneficiaries are allocated less than 1 000 ha per beneficiary, 
others, who are not disadvantaged, receive considerably more land. In one case, a farm of 
11 756 ha was allocated to a man reported to be the Managing Director of a fishing company 
whose wife was reportedly the Regional Director of Education in Omaheke (The Windhoek 
Observer, 20.12.2008). 
Public dissatisfaction with the selection of beneficiaries has surfaced in the national press from 
time to time. For example, there have been accusations of rampant nepotism in allocating 
land in Omaheke. In 2007, New Era reported under the headline “Murky land handouts” 
that relatives of the Regional Director of Planning in that region had been allocated land. 
He was reported to have been a member of the RRC. The newspaper criticised the fact that 
there was no transparency in land allocations. The MLR practice of placing advertisements 
in local newspapers announcing successful beneficiaries was said to have ended in 2002. 
A public argument ensued between the Regional Governor and the MLR spokesperson 
over whose responsibility it was to make such announcements. The Governor stated that 
Regional Councils played only an advisory role since decentralisation in land administration 
had not been fully implemented. Although activities in certain areas were co-ordinated 
“through a process of mutual co-operation we … have no power to make anything more than 
recommendations. Who are we in this process?” (New Era, 28.9.2007)
The regional office of the MLR was also accused of abusing its powers in relation to land 
allocations in Omaheke. When the village council of Drimiopsis decided that farmers who 
had cattle within the village boundaries had to remove them, some, including the Regional 
Councillor for that constituency and the Deputy Minister of Fisheries, were resettled on 
other government land. Other people seemingly were not so lucky. Two brothers who had 
gradually built up their livestock numbers since starting from very small beginnings at 
Drimiopsis in 1997 were not given that option and were told instead to leave under threat of 
arrest. After the Deputy Director of Resettlement intervened, they were offered settlement 
on a piece of land which had been allocated to the head of the MLR regional office. After 
some time, the latter wanted to evict them again but they refused to leave. During the 
course of this dispute it was alleged that the head of the regional office was also renting 
out portions of his land to a white commercial farmer (New Era, 28.3.2007).
To compound matters, Regional Councillors in Omaheke have allocated land to individuals 
without the approval of the RRC. This practice was facilitated by the existence of a number of 
government farms where large numbers of people had been settled temporarily. Although 
many of these people had been living on these farms for several years, officially they 
were ‘temporary settlers’ and hence had not been allocated defined portions of land. This 
presented opportunities for regional politicians with farms to accommodate people who 
had lost their employment on commercial farms or elsewhere. This happened at, for example, 
Du Plessis in Omaheke. In a very real sense these farms became reservoirs for people who 
had nowhere else to go.
Government has also come in for some criticism regarding land allocation in Hardap Region. 
In the first half of 2008, a group of farmers who had been evicted from a government farm 
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in Hardap criticised government for allocating land to well-known SWAPO party members 
without advertising the land as required by law. At least one MLR official was mentioned by 
name as a beneficiary (The Namibian, 7.5.2008).8 
In an attempt to address some of the perceived shortcomings of the selection criteria as 
set out in official policy documents, the Hardap RRC developed its own criteria. According 
to an official of the MLR in Mariental, the criteria for selecting resettlement beneficiaries 
were based on the National Resettlement Policy until 2006, and in 2007 it was decided that 
additional criteria were required for Hardap in connection with the following:
(a)  “Constituency balance” – ensuring that applicants from different constituencies receive 
equal consideration during the selection process.
(b)  “Gender equality” – ensuring an equitable gender balance in the selection process.
(c)  “People with disabilities” – ensuring that these people are prioritised when applying 
for resettlement (this being in line with the target groups specified for prioritisation in 
the National Resettlement Policy).
(d)  “Carrying capacity” – ensuring that the number of livestock owned by an applicant 
does not exceed the number determined by the carrying capacity of the farm unit 
applied for, but that they do own at least the equivalent of 75% of the carrying capacity 
of the land applied for. 
(e)  “Good financial standing” – a criterion apparently applying for applicants being 
considered for allocation of a main homestead or farmhouse, which requires sufficient 
income to cover maintenance costs and settle Nampower electricity accounts. (An 
income of N$4 000 per month was required, but N$8 000 was preferred. Beneficiaries 
were expected to become self-reliant rather than be a “burden” for the Ministry.)
The weighting of these criteria in considering applications was not clear. The last criterion, 
however, suggests that poor people – those with little or no income, for example – did not 
stand much chance of being considered for resettlement.
The Minister of Lands and Resettlement acknowledged the skewed allocation of land in 
favour of better-off individuals and the fact that officials may not have followed procedures 
properly. In the MLR budget debate in 2009, the Ministry was criticised for allocating land 
to government officials, the rich and the “greedy”, instead of to the poor and needy. The 
Minister responded that such allocations may have been the result of “mistakes” made by 
MLR officials, but that the legal and policy frameworks were clear and had to be followed 
(Die Republikein, 5.5.2009).
The MLR has responded to these criticisms and concerns by reviewing the selection criteria 
for beneficiaries and the implementation of the land reform programme. The MLR’s “Draft 
Resettlement Manual” is currently under discussion in the Ministry and promises to solve 
many of the issues raised by members of the public and politicians.
8 The research team was unsuccessful in its attempts to include him in the survey sample.
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2.8 Land acquisition and allocation
Land acquisition in Namibia is ‘proactive’ in the sense that the MLR buys freehold land 
for subdivision and redistribution to people in need of land. The state has committed 
itself to the “willing seller, willing buyer” (WSWB) principle for acquiring freehold land. 
It has been argued that this principle protects the interests of landowners in so far as it 
neither compels them to sell against their will, nor forces them to sell at a price with which 
they are not fully satisfied (Lahiff 2005: 2).
In some government and public circles the WSWB principle has been singled out as the root 
cause of the slow acquisition of commercial farmland for resettlement purposes (Gurirab 
2004). As a result, the government announced plans in February 2004 to implement an 
expropriation option for commercial agricultural land to speed up its efforts to buy more 
land for the resettlement programme.
The government blamed commercial farmers for the slow pace of land reform, arguing that 
they only offered to sell small, uneconomical plots for resettlement under the WSWB option. 
In his farewell speech as Minister of Lands and Resettlement, Namibia’s President Pohamba 
stated that “those who have land to sell [should sell] a little land to the Government at fair 
prices so that we [the Government] have land to give to the landless people” in order to 
avoid a situation where “Namibia could be made ungovernable” if the “‘have-nots’ patience 
with the current slow process of land reform runs out” (The Namibian, 22.3.2005).
It has been argued that much more land has been available for purchase than the government 
has been able to purchase. The Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), an independent 
research organisation in Namibia, has stated that the slow process of land reform should be 
attributed to “leaden-footed bureaucracy, rather than commercial farmers dragging their 
heels” (quoted in De Villiers 2003: 38). Despite government’s intention to speed up the land 
reform process with the introduction of the expropriation principle in 2004, in addition to 
the WSWB principle, land reform continues to proceed at a slow pace. In 2008 the MLR 
acquired only 3 out of approximately 70 commercial farms which exchanged hands in that 
year (Die Republikein, 5.5.2009). 
Namibian land policy and legislation provides for a preferent right of land acquisition by 
the state and a land tax. In terms of the ACLRA, the state enjoys a right of first refusal on 
all freehold land that is offered for sale in the market. Once the MLR has indicated its non-
interest in obtaining a particular farm, it issues a waiver which entitles the seller to look for 
a private buyer.
A land tax was introduced in 2004 with expectations that it would bring more land onto 
the market (Sherbourne 2009: 6). Information gleaned from MLR Annual Reports does not 
suggest that this has happened. The data suggests that the number of farms offered to the 
MLR reached a peak of 344 in the year preceding the introduction of the land tax and then 
decreased. Revenues from the land tax swelled the coffers of the Land Acquisition and 
Development Fund established to pay for purchasing land and developing the land purchased. 
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Despite these measures, the amount of suitable land for resettlement offered to the MLR 
has gradually decreased over the last few years, while waivers to sell on the open market 
have increased. Several factors are responsible for this situation.
One is that ‘affirmative action buyers’ are competing with the MLR for quality land. As the 
AALS is regarded as a component of the effort to address the inequality in freehold land 
ownership, the MLR took a policy decision to exempt landowners wishing to sell their land 
to AALS buyers from obtaining a waiver. Many prospective landowners prefer to sell their 
land to AALS buyers rather than government because this gives them an opportunity to 
negotiate a price with the prospective buyer without fear of being unable to withdraw their 
offer to sell. The success of such a transaction depends on seller and buyer negotiating a 
price acceptable to both parties, and the buyer mobilising the purchase capital through an 
AALS loan and his/her own resources.
The result of this process is that AALS buyers buy the best farmland before the MLR has a 
chance to assess such land for the resettlement programme. Consequently, the MLR claims 
that much of the land offered to it is of inferior quality and often unsuitable for resettlement. 
The Ministry blames the slow pace of land acquisition on this state of affairs.
The escalation of farm prices has been another serious bottleneck. The WSWB principle 
is based on “market value”, but neither the ACLRA nor the National Land Policy defines this 
term. In discussing the right to expropriate private property, Namibia’s Constitution refers 
to “just compensation” (Article 16). “Just compensation” is not necessarily limited to market 
value but could also refer to a farm’s production value – a criterion that many financial 
institutions use.
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In view of these bottlenecks, and in order to speed up redistribution, the state has made 
limited use of expropriation of commercial farms for resettlement purposes. Since 2004 when 
the intention to employ this strategy was formally announced in the National Assembly, only 
three farms have been expropriated against compensation. The MLR does intend making 
more use of this strategy during the NDP3 period to redistribute more land (RoN 2008). 
The pace of land redistribution in Namibia is not driven by the demand for land, but rather 
by what is available to government on the open market or by way of expropriation. The land 
redistribution programme does not give small-scale farmers an option to buy portions of 
commercial farms with financial support from government. Instead, potential land reform 
beneficiaries have to apply to the MLR for resettlement in response to advertisements of 
farms available for resettlement. This places illiterate people at a major disadvantage. Suzman 
raised the problem of widespread illiteracy in the resettlement application process, especially 
for San people who have little experience in dealing with bureaucratic procedures (Suzman 
2001: 89).
Land is allocated to individual beneficiaries. The ACLRA provides for beneficiaries to obtain 
long-term lease agreements, but to date not a single lease agreement has been registered 
in the Deeds Office. A recent press release stated that the MLR was about to start issuing 
lease agreements for 190 farming units on 54 farms across the country. These units had been 
surveyed and valued. Fifty-two farming units are located in Omaheke Region, and two of 
these, Drimiopsis and Grootrooibult, fall within the current study area (Die Republikein, 
18.5.2009). 
Advertisements for allocation of subdivided farms are placed once the Division of Land Use 
Planning in the MLR has assessed farms and prepared allotment plans. The mandate of the 
Division is to be “the national systematic assessor of the natural resources potential, which 
makes alternatives for land use, economic and social conditions in order to select the best 
land use options” (MLR 2006: 11).
Farm subdivisions in the study area have been based on farm development plans prepared 
by the Department of Agricultural Technical Services in the early 1970s under the provisions 
of the Soil Conservation Act of 1969. In terms of this Act, farmers were able to obtain 
subsidies for internal fencing provided that an agricultural extension officer had drawn 
up a farm plan. The aim was to encourage more sustainable utilisation of freehold farms by 
enabling farmers to increase the number of internal camps to facilitate rotational grazing.
One problem with this approach of the MLR is that land use planners did not always verify 
whether the internal fences proposed in the farm plans were ever erected. On some of the 
farms visited, specific camps without perimeter fencing had been allocated to beneficiaries. 
The implication was that many beneficiaries could not clearly identify the land allocated to 
them due to the absence of boundary fences. In other cases they were allocated a number 
of proposed camps which were indicated on the farm map but were not fenced. Where 
boundary fences between beneficiaries’ allocations do not exist, pastures are utilised on a 
communal basis. 
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The process from land acquisition to final settlement is prescribed in the ACLRA and has 
been criticised as cumbersome and time-consuming. Altogether 45 administrative actions 
have to be taken by MLR staff in every case. It takes up to 441 days to complete the entire 
process from accepting an offer of land to resettlement. One big problem with this long 
timespan is that of widespread vandalism on farms acquired by the MLR which lie idle while 
their allocation is being considered, which leaves the beneficiaries with ruined infrastructure 
(Meliczek 2008: 23, 21). Technicians in the MLR are required to do the technical work and 
make recommendations to the LRAC, which in turn advises the Minister on which course 
of action to take. The process is briefly summed up in the box below.
sUMMaRY OF tHE LaND DELivERY PROcEss
At the technical level, the MLR sends staff members to a farm that is offered to assess 
the farm’s suitability for resettlement. If it is found to be suitable, valuers value the 
property. Finally, land allocation and subdivision maps are prepared by different MLR 
staff members who undertake separate field trips to the farm.
Regional Resettlement Committees (RRCs) are responsible for selecting suitable appli-
cants for resettlement from their respective regions. Each RRC proposes one applicant to 
the Land Reform Advisory Commission (LRAC). The LRAC reviews the nominations from 
each region, selects one candidate and recommends him/her to the Minister of Lands for 
approval. 
The whole process of land acquisition and allocation is slow and cumbersome, taking 
at least 411 days. The LRAC activities take up to 25% of the total timespan. Documents 
referring to the resettlement of one particular farm are submitted six times to the LRAC 
and four times to the Minister.
source: Meliczek 2008: 13
Typical farm demarcation notes submitted to the LRAC convey the particulars of the farm, 
the price at which it is offered and the existing infrastructure. Development planners make 
a recommendation on how the farm should be subdivided and propose a specific land use. It 
is not surprising that in an agro-ecological region which is suitable for extensive livestock 
farming primarily, this is the most frequent recommendation. Evidence suggests that little 
work goes into exploring possibilities for diversifying existing land use patterns. 
The type of land use accepted by the LRAC is entered as a condition of lease in the lease 
agreement between the government and the beneficiaries. This document carries the official 
title of “Lease Agreement”, but does not satisfy the legal requirements for registration as 
such in the Deeds Office. This state of affairs has sown confusion among many resettlement 
farmers interviewed in this LaLR study, who believed that the document they received 
from the MLR is indeed a leasehold agreement with the government. By law, any proposed 
deviation from the land use stipulated in the ‘lease agreement’ requires the prior approval 
of the Minister.
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The whole process of farm assessment, valuation and planning for allocation is highly 
centralised in the MLR. Suzman argued in 2001 that government’s approach to resettlement 
was top-down, particularly with regard to San settlers:
Settlers have no officially mandated say in determining the direction of the development 
of resettlement facilities: their participation in decision-making processes is restricted 
to the extent that MLRR officials with the power to make decisions choose to consult 
them or heed their advice, if ever they do (Suzman 2001: 91).
In effect the MLR placed the onus on settlers to conform to the process rather than adapting 
the process to fit the needs of settlers (Maclean 1998: 86, cited in ibid.).
2.9 Unauthorised land occupations
Unauthorised land occupations have not been frequent. Where they have occurred, some 
of the people involved ascribed their actions to the slowness of the land-delivery process. 
There have been reports of cases in which people occupied state land that had been lying 
idle for considerable periods. Although such invasions have been the exception, every case 
was met by the full force of the law.
The only unauthorised occupation reported in Omaheke Region took place in mid 1998 
when 56 Herero-speaking families occupied 10 farms located in Omaheke and neighbouring 
Otjozondjupa Region which the MLRR had purchased for redistribution. Having failed to 
persuade the families to leave the farms they had occupied illegally over a period of five 
months, the Ministry obtained a court order to evict them. 
Among those illegally occupying these farms were senior civil servants in the Ministry 
of Regional and Local Government and Housing (MRLGH) and the Office of the Speaker. 
The Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation stated that the police did not 
investigate the complaints laid by the MLRR regarding the illegal occupation, apparently on 
instruction from the Minister of Home Affairs. (The latter became the Minister of Lands 
and Resettlement in 2005.) The MLRR subsequently laid criminal charges against some of 
the farmers for trespassing in terms of the Trespass Ordinance No. 3 of 1962.
The Minister of Lands interpreted these illegal occupations as a possible attempt by certain 
individuals and groups to challenge the government. She further stated that the majority of 
those who occupied state farms were not poor people but rather senior civil servants, and 
alleged that many of them had fenced off large tracts of communal land.
In fighting back, the “56 Landless Namibian Farmers” organisation said that they would be 
forced to occupy private land to reclaim their ancestral land rights. They claimed to have 
linked up with some trade unions in Namibia as well as “pioneers” in Zimbabwe. While the 
56 NLF promised to abide by the Court’s decision to have them evicted, they threatened to 
occupy the Roman Catholic Church’s farm and mission station, Epukiro, as well as private 
farms surrounding the 10 state farms. 
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Herero traditional leaders ascribed the evictions to “apartheid and tribalism”, and viewed 
them as politically motivated. However, the majority (30 out of 56) of the people concerned 
were SWAPO supporters who vacated the farms without a demonstration, saying that as 
SWAPO supporters they did not want to fight their own government. Herero Chief Riruako, 
on the other hand, said that SWAPO members had never lost land and yet were the first to 
benefit from land redistribution (Werner 2003: 15-16).
Subsequent threats made by trade union leaders and regional politicians in Omaheke to 
grab commercial farmland and carry out Zimbabwe-style invasions of commercial farms 
have not materialised (ibid.: 20). However, the SWAPO Chief Whip recently argued that the 
WSWB concept is not working and that government needs to make another plan, “even if 
we grab land Zimbabwe style” (Die Republikein, 5.5.2009).
2.10 institutional framework governing
   resettlement
The ACLRA stipulates that the functions of land appraisal, land use planning, demarcation, 
selection of beneficiaries and land allocation will be carried out by the MLA, and to date 
the whole process of land delivery has been highly centralised. However, the National 
Resettlement Policy of 2001 identifies a range of line ministries and NGOs which are 
expected to support land redistribution in their respective areas of responsibility. The 
Ministries include: Agriculture, Water and Forestry; Environment and Tourism; Regional 
and Local Government, Housing and Rural Development; Education; and Health and Social 
Services. The contributions of these Ministries to the land reform process have ranged from 
non-existent to reasonably good. Co-operation and co-ordination with the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Water and Forestry remains elusive. The National Resettlement Policy reiterates 
policy statements in an earlier version (1997) that it is vital to involve Regional Councils in 
the planning and implementation phases of the National Resettlement Programme (NRP). The 
policy of 2001 states that resettlement schemes, once established by MLR headquarters, 
should be one of the responsibilities of the Regional Councils (MLR 2001a: 12).
This is in line with Namibia’s Decentralisation Policy which identifies resettlement as one 
of the functions to be decentralised. To comply with this policy, the MLR has identified 
the activities and resources to be decentralised to Regional Councils, and has prepared a 
draft schedule of activities and a timetable for the implementation of its Decentralisation 
Action Plan.9 At the time of writing, the MLR was still busy finalising its decentralisation of 
functions, and a number of Regional Councils were reported to be ready to accept some of 
the decentralised responsibilities.
In 1999 the MLR identified the need to establish bodies at regional and local level “to identify 
regional needs and to undertake selection to assist with the allocation (sic)” (The Land, 2(2), 
1999: 4). These bodies, i.e. the Regional Resettlement Committees (RRCs), are expected to 
9 See http://www.decentralisation.gov.na/roleplayers/1_nat_gov/Ministry_of_Lands.html (accessed 23.4.2009).
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give regional and traditional leaders an opportunity to provide inputs into the resettlement 
process (ibid.). 
In terms of the “Draft Resettlement Manual”, the RRCs consist of 13 members each, with each 
chaired by the Regional Governor. The Regional Deputy Director of the MLR serves as Vice-
Chairperson, and the other members of each RRC are: 2 representatives of the MAWF; 1 
Regional Health Officer; 1 Regional Education Officer; 2 Regional Councillors; 1 traditional 
leader; 1 representative of youth; 1 representative of women’s organisations; 1 representative 
of NGOs; and 1 representative of farmers’ unions (RoN n.d.: 3).
The functions of the RRCs as described in the “Draft Resettlement Manual” (ibid.) are:
 z identification of regional resettlement needs;
 z help to select farms in the region;
 z receiving and processing of resettlement application forms;
 z recommendation of resettlement beneficiaries; and 
 z monitoring of regional resettlement projects and promoting development.
Despite this catalogue of functions, the role of the RRCs continues to be limited to assisting 
in the selection of beneficiaries. They convene only when the need arises, i.e. when farms in 
their respective regions have been advertised. Applications to be settled on an advertised 
farm are directed to the office of the MLR in the region in which the farm is located. This 
office collates the applications and then calls a meeting of the RRC to discuss them. 
In the past, the RRCs discussed shortlisted applicants and made recommendations to the 
National Resettlement Committee (NRC). Like the RRCs, the NRC is not required by law. 
Its existence was first made known in the revised National Resettlement Policy of 2001 
(RoN 2001: 12). In terms of this policy, the NRC is an interministerial committee composed 
of all line ministries involved in the land reform process as well as Agribank and the 
Namibia Development Corporation (NDC) – 12 institutions in total. The NRC’s functions 
are not described in any detail in the policy, except to say that, like the Land Acquisition 
Committee, it seeks to bring together and utilise as broad a range of expertise as possible 
for the “identification, planning, implementation and evaluation” of resettlement projects 
(ibid.: 9).
The NRC was not obliged to accept the RRC recommendations. Once the NRC had reviewed 
the regional recommendations, it forwarded them to the LRAC which in turn made final 
recommendations to the Minister. With the Minister’s approval of these recommendations, 
letters were sent to the beneficiaries to inform them that their applications were successful.
In recent years, however, RRCs have sent their recommendations directly to the LRAC, 
cutting out the NRC.
Table 5 lists the institutions involved in the land reform process and sums up their main 
tasks. 
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table 5: institutions involved in land reform and resettlement, and their roles
iNstitUtiON ROLE iN REsEttLEMENt
Ministry of Lands and Resettlement
i) Directorate of Resettlement z Planning and co-ordination of resettlement programmes
z Implementation of projects
z Supervision of resettlement projects
z Monitoring and evaluation of projects
ii) Directorate of Lands z Registration of leases
z Resource surveys and planning of proposed resettlement areas
z Development of planning guidelines and training of planners
iii) Office of the Surveyor-General z Provision of mapping and photography at appropriate scales
iv) Registrar of Deeds z Registration of leases and other real rights
v) Directorate of General Services z Financial control
z Planning and evaluation
Ministry of agriculture, Water and Forestry z Provision of veterinary services
z Assistance in evaluating farms
z Provision of agricultural extension and training
z Provision of credit facilities
z Provision of water
z Collection of grazing fees
z Survey, installation and maintenance of water points
z Support of co-operative schemes
z Market development
Ministry of Environment and tourism
Department of Environmental Affairs z Assisting in planning of wildlife-based resettlement schemes
z Ensuring environmental soundness of plans
Ministry of Regional and Local government, 
Housing and Rural Development
Proclamation of resettlement areas when essential
Ministry of Works and transport Provision of infrastructure in resettlement areas
Ministry of Education Provision of education, teachers and relevant materials
Ministry of Health and social services Provision of health services
National Planning commission Advising on project planning issues and funding
Namibia Development corporation z Provision of credit to aspiring small-scale farmers
z Assisting in planning of schemes and training of beneficiaries in
  relevant situations
agricultural Bank of Namibia (agribank) z Provisions of credit loans
z Assistance in evaluating application forms
Non-governmental organisations Planning, extension services, materials input and training where 
relevant
Land tribunal – established by the Agricultural 
(Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995
Recommendations to the Minister in terms of the Act
Land Reform advisory commission – established 
by the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 
of 1995)
z Recommendations to the Minister on applications for
 resettlement compensation for expropriated farms and other 
  issues as outlined by the Act
source: Harring and Odendaal 2002
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2.11 Frameworks for interaction between  
the state and civil society
Civil society organisations in the land reform sector are either non-existent or very weak. 
The point has been made that there are no advocacy groups lobbying government for a pro-
poor land reform programme. But an official framework for such co-operation has been 
developed. In 2005, government released a policy document on civic organisations and 
partnership (NPC 2005). This policy was developed in recognition of the prominent role 
that civic organisations have played in the development of Namibia generally. It seeks to 
define the sector as well as establish a framework for partnerships between government 
and civil society that is transparent and characterised by accountability (ibid.: 1). 
Research suggests that SWAPO has had a complex relationship with civil society organi-
sations, which undoubtedly was shaped by the demands of the armed struggle. SWAPO’s 
mobilisation strategy during the struggle did not provide much support to local community-
based organisations. According to Dobell (1995: 172), the focus on mobilising the international 
community meant that little mobilisation was undertaken inside the country. This was 
so because SWAPO was opposed to any form of community-based development work 
inside the country on the grounds that it might “divert energy and resources away from 
the political struggle for Independence”. Grassroots development projects, even though 
initiated by members of SWAPO and/or allied institutions, were thought to “obscure the 
roots of oppression and poverty, encourage reformism and diminish revolutionary fervour” 
(Steenkamp 1995: 107). In addition, SWAPO feared that community-based development 
projects might strengthen other civil society organisations and institutions relative to SWAPO, 
thereby “loosening its control and perhaps challenging its status as sole and authentic 
representative of the Namibian people” (ibid.: 108). In the field of labour, Tapscott (1995: 
158) suggested that SWAPO’s interest in organised labour was instrumental largely in so 
far as it was aimed at generating support for the liberation struggle rather than fighting for 
workplace demands to be met.
Pressure on SWAPO to agree to the provision of external aid and to support community-
based development organisations’ efforts to mobilise and support local communities 
increased. This pressure came from its internal wing and the Council of Churches in 
Namibia (CCN) which was closely aligned with SWAPO. Finally SWAPO agreed to such 
aid being provided, subject to stringent conditions. These included that all foreign aid 
had to be channelled through the CCN and had to be used for educational rather than 
socio-economic projects. “The CCN [thus] became the conduit for SWAPO patronage” 
(Steenkamp 1995: 108). 
Roughly coinciding with this change in policy, the early 1980s witnessed an upsurge in the 
formation of community-based organisations (CBOs). This was partially due to a growing 
cynicism that Independence would not come within months or even years, which fuelled 
scepticism about the ability of external diplomacy alone to bring about Independence. 
Progressive activists also exploited the political space that opened up on account of SWAPO’s 
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reluctant agreement to allow civil society organisations to become active in communities 
(Strauss 1990: 225). By the mid 1980s there were more than 50 and seemingly close to 100 
CBOs and NGOs active in such fields as literacy promotion, legal advice and representation, 
housing, community media, education, agriculture and culture (ibid.: 229-230). 
However, the colonial government regarded these organisations and their respective 
development projects as a threat. Projects run by CBOs sympathetic to SWAPO were likely 
to compete with government’s own ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns designed to win over 
the black population (ibid.: 224). South African occupation forces effectively prevented the 
growth of independent community-based NGOs in the northern regions of the country, “in 
the belief that they could be mobilised towards resistance by forces sympathetic to SWAPO” 
(ibid.: 225). Together with “SWAPO’s own penchant for authoritarianism” and autocratic 
traditional authority structures, Tapscott concluded that it was not possible for mass-based 
organisations to emerge (Tapscott 2001: 322).
Immediately after Independence, in 1991, government mobilised civil society organisations 
across the country to participate in the National Conference on Land Reform and the Land 
Question. The aim of the conference was to achieve consensus on how the land question in 
Namibia should be tackled with maximum popular participation. Five hundred people from 
several hundred NGOs debated for five days. At the end of these deliberations, 24 consensus 
resolutions were passed which were not binding on government but were supposed to guide 
government in policy development. 
Although this conference was widely regarded as a major departure from SWAPO’s 
pre-Independence practice of not including the general population in policy debates, this 
approach was not sustained in later policy development. On the basis of resolutions of 
the conference and the recommendations of the Technical Committee on Commercial 
Farmland, the development of legislation10 on land reform was left to technocrats with little 
if any input from civil society organisations. 
NGOs criticised government for not consulting civil society on the drafting of land reform 
legislation and dragging its feet. The Namibian Non-Governmental Organisations Forum 
(NANGOF), an NGO umbrella organisation, organised a conference in 1994 to discuss 
the land question and put forward recommendations to government on land policy and 
legislation. Invitations issued by the NGO Working Committee on Land Reform to senior 
ministers to address the conference were declined, and the Minister of Lands, Resettlement 
and Rehabilitation tabled draft legislation on land redistribution in the National Assembly 
while NGOs were discussing the land question (NGO-WCLR 1994).
Government also came under fire from its own allies for its lack of consultation. In 1999 the 
National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW), a trade union federation allied to SWAPO, 
launched a stinging attack on government for failing to consult people about land. It stated: 
“Yes, people are consulted during the process of policy formulation. However, it is the 
10 The Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act was passed in 1995, three years before the National 
Land Policy was approved.
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conviction of the majority [of Namibians] that consultation only serves as a public relations 
exercise. The input of people is not always taken into account.” (The Namibian, 2.7.1999) 
Similarly, the Namibia National Farmers Union (NNFU) representing communal farmers 
alleged that its policy recommendations were not taken seriously by government. Against 
this, the Minster of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation stated that her Ministry held 
regular consultations with the NNFU (Die Republikein, 10.9.1999).
NANGOF all but ceased to exist after organising the 1994 alternative land conference as the 
umbrella body of NGOs involved in land reform. The handful of NGOs which were active 
in aspects of land reform carried on with their work very much on their own. Most of these 
activities consisted of supporting capacity building in the MLR, in Communal Land Boards 
and for land reform beneficiaries, and supporting livelihood support programmes for San 
beneficiaries in group resettlement projects as well as work on legal aspects of land reform 
and the management of natural resources.
Only one NGO, the LAC, is directly involved in policy advocacy work. It regularly publishes 
reports on different aspects of land reform, usually with clear policy recommendations. 
The fact that the poor and landless are not organised allows government to ignore – with one 
or two exceptions – the inputs of civil society organisations. The exception to this is the 
Namibia Agricultural Union (NAU), the body representing commercial farmers. The NAU 
has regular meetings with the Minister of Lands and Resettlement, and over the years has 
developed a number of documents reflecting its views on different aspects of land reform, 
such as expropriation and minimum farm sizes, with recommendations on how the policy 
framework should be changed. It is a strong proponent of negotiated land reform, an idea 
that has resonated at the highest level of government. The recommendations of the PTT 
which Cabinet approved in April 2006 included that the MLR, “together with land owners’ 
representatives (i.e. the Namibia Agriculture [sic] Union) could negotiate a solution to the 
short- and medium-term acquisition of land” (Katoma 2006: 1). In April 2009 the Minister 
of Lands and Resettlement announced that a land reform forum would be established, in 
which all stakeholders would be represented. 
Apart from policy work, the NAU in association with the Namibia National Farmers Union 
(NNFU) has developed and is implementing a programme to support emerging commercial 
farmers. These are primarily beneficiaries of the AALS but increasingly also of the NRP.
Despite these NGO activities in support of land reform, civil society is not very well 
developed in the land reform sector. A lot more needs to be done to satisfy the aim of 
the National Resettlement Policy to invite NGOs “to become involved in the provision of 
planning, training, extension services, material inputs and outsourcing of projects” (MLR 
2001a: 12). The MLR’s Strategic Plan 2006-2010 foresees assessing the mandates, roles and 
responsibilities of all stakeholders, including NGOs, to improve co-ordination with such 
organisations (MLR 2007: 9).
A glimmer of hope may be the fact that at the end of May 2009, NANGOF was officially re-
launched as the main umbrella body for civil society organisations in the Namibia.
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3.1 Hardap
Spanning an area of 109 659 km2, Hardap Region covers approximately 13% of Namibia’s 
total land surface. Approximately 75% of the land in Hardap is owned under freehold title, 
predominantly by white farm owners. Communal areas occupy about 10% of the region, 
while the remaining 15%, in the west of the region, has been proclaimed as a national park 
(NPC 2006b: 17). No recent data exists on average farm sizes, but in 1991 the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Water and Rural Development estimated the average sizes in Maltahöhe and 
Mariental Districts to be 14 042 ha and 8 835 ha respectively (RoN 1991: 131).
Due to low annual rainfall combined with high inter-seasonal variations in precipitation, 
Hardap is an arid region. According to the Atlas of Namibia, the median annual rainfall in 
most of Maltahöhe District ranges from 100 mm to 150 mm, while Mariental District is 
slightly more fortunate with a median of 150 mm to 200 mm per annum (Mendelsohn et al. 
2002: 85). Rainfall variability ranges between 40% and 80% across these two districts (ibid.: 
86). Drought occurs frequently in this region. Much of Maltahöhe District receives less than 
50 mm every 14 years and Mariental District less than 100 mm (ibid.: 90). 
Population density in the region is very low at 0.6 people per km2. Almost three quarters of 
the population are classified as “rural”, living as wage labourers on commercial farms or on 
communal land (Central Bureau of Statistics 2003: 7). Only 9% of all households identified 
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farming as their main source of household income in 2001, compared to 61% for whom 
wages or salaries were the main source (ibid.). 
Economic data disaggregated by region does not exist in Namibia. It is therefore not possible 
to say what the relative economic contributions of different sectors to the regional economy 
are. A brief description of Hardap in the Second National Development Plan (NDP2) states: 
[The Hardap] economy is essentially driven by a large non-tradable sector supported by 
servicing and production sectors. Trade and industry activities are largely concentrated 
in the agricultural sector, mainly small-stock (RoN n.d. [2001]: 40).
Extensive livestock farming is the main land-based economic activity in Hardap, and there 
is also limited crop production. Mendelsohn et al. (2002: 147) estimated that approximately 
4 000 ha of land had been cleared for crop production. It is not clear how much of this 
land was under cultivation at the time of this LaLR study, and how much is irrigation land. 
About 2 000 ha are being irrigated at Hardap Dam, by water from the dam. Further east, 
just over 600 ha are being irrigated in the Auob-Stampriet area which has rich artesian 
water (NWRMR 2000: 11; Lange et al. 1997: 33). 
Since the late 1980s, an increasing number of commercial farmers have diversified out of 
agriculture into commercial hunting and tourism. Among the factors that contributed to this 
was the collapse of the international market for karakul pelts, which massively curtailed the 
previously lucrative commercial activity of karakul pelt production in southern Namibia. 
Some farmers replaced karakul farming with mutton production by raising dorper sheep 
and goats instead of karakul sheep. In 2002, dorper sheep and goats outnumbered karakul 
by 4 to 1. The change from karakul pelt to mutton production had serious environmental 
and economic ramifications for the farming sector in the south. Grazing practices and needs 
of sheep bred for meat differed markedly from those of karakul. The intake of pasturage of 
sheep bred for meat is generally greater than that of karakul (Mendelsohn 2006: 54). Many 
existing farms became too small to accommodate enough ‘mutton sheep’ to compensate for 
the loss of revenue resulting from the collapse of the pelt market. The economic impact 
of this transformation has not been documented, but it was devastating for the applicable 
farmers, many of whom reportedly went bankrupt. The negative economic effects of this 
agricultural transformation may also explain why the MLRR found ready sellers of land in 
both Maltahöhe and Mariental Districts in the early 1990s.
Despite agriculture being the main economic sector in Hardap, in 2002 it employed only 
about 31% of the 18 364 people employed in the region, compared to nearly 50% employed by 
the private/public sectors (NPC 2006b: 23). Evidence suggests that agricultural employment 
opportunities are decreasing rapidly. Regular surveys on agricultural wages conducted 
by the Agricultural Employers’ Association11 have shown that agricultural employment in 
11 The sample for these surveys is drawn from members of the Namibia Agricultural Union which represents 
approximately 50% of all commercial farmers. The picture that these surveys paint must be regarded 
as more positive than the average situation, as those volunteering information are probably among the 
better-off commercial farmers.
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Namibia as a whole has declined steadily since 1998. From 2002 to 2004 alone, it declined 
by 39% overall. Significantly, the highest decline of 80% was in the category of temporary 
employment (Agricultural Employers’ Association 2004: 7). In the absence of regionally 
disaggregated data, it has to be assumed that Hardap was no exception vis-à-vis the down-
ward trend in agricultural employment. The decline of karakul farming has certainly 
contributed to the gradual decline in temporary employment opportunities in this region 
(NPC 2006b: 58).
General insecurity among commercial farmers was cited as the main reason for farmers’ 
reluctance to fill vacancies on their farms. “Militant labour unrest”, “unrealistic demands” 
made by the Namibian Farm Workers’ Union, minimum wages and land tax were some of 
the specific reasons cited (ibid.).
In addition to receiving cash wages and remuneration in kind, some farm workers have 
been permitted to keep a limited number of livestock on commercial farms. The Wage Survey 
of 2004 suggests that 29% of permanent farm workers kept livestock on commercial farms 
where they worked. On average they kept 23 small stock, 5 large stock and 3 horses/mules/
donkeys (Agricultural Employers’ Association 2004: 17). One respondent in this LaLR survey 
stated that workers on the farm Haribes were allowed to keep a maximum of 25 goats at 
cattle posts. Goats in excess of this limit either had to be sold or taken to the communal 
area to be looked after by relatives (see also NPC 2006a: 77). Alternatively, people applied 
for resettlement, as is discussed below.
The very first farms acquired by government after Independence were in Hardap Region. 
It is not entirely clear why this was so, but it seems reasonable to assume that the financial 
situation of many farmers made more land available in the southern regions (Hardap and 
Karas) than elsewhere in the country. 
3.1.1 Land redistribution
By August 2007, the MLR had purchased 28 farms or portions of farms totalling 164 972 ha 
in Hardap (MLR to LAC, 13.8.2007). If it is assumed that 75% (8.2 million ha) of the region’s 
total area is utilised for commercial farming, this represents 2% of all freehold farmland in 
the region. The MLR claims to have settled 155 families on this freehold land, giving each 
family an average of 1 064 ha. This average stands in contrast to the finding of the PTT that 
beneficiaries in the south were allocated 2 138 ha on average, and is substantially less than 
the recommendation of the LRAC that land allocations in the southern regions should not 
be smaller than 3 000 ha per beneficiary household (PTT 2005b: 52). It is not possible from 
the current survey to calculate the average allocation per beneficiary, as many beneficiaries 
did not know how much land they were allocated.
Twenty per cent of FURS beneficiaries interviewed in the current survey were farming on a 
part-time basis. Forty-five per cent of these had kept livestock on a commercial farm before 
moving onto resettlement land, while 25% had previously farmed on communal land. 
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A list provided by Agribank in October 2007 showed that 23 commercial farms had been 
bought under the AALS in Mariental District and 24 in Maltahöhe District. Forty per cent 
of the AALS farmers interviewed were part-time farmers. Half of these had farmed on 
communal land before buying a farm, while 30% had kept livestock on commercial farms.
3.2 Omaheke
Omaheke Region is located in eastern Namibia, bordering Botswana. Spanning an area of 
8 461 200 ha, it is the fifth largest region of Namibia. Almost 50% or 3 543 044 ha of land in 
Omaheke is registered under freehold title, and the remainder is communal land. In 2001 
the freehold area consisted of approximately 800 commercial farms (MAWF 2001).
The agro-ecological zones in which Omaheke and Hardap Regions fall are very different. 
Omaheke is in a summer rainfall area. Average annual rainfall decreases in a north-south 
direction, ranging from as low as 250 mm per annum in the extreme south of the region 
(Aminuis Constituency) to between 350 mm and 400 mm in the areas north of Gobabis (the 
region’s municipal centre, located roughly in the middle of the region). Rainfall is confined 
to the months of December to April, the remaining seven months being dry (NPC 2006a: 1). 
Omaheke is predominantly a savannah environment in which Terminalia combretum and 
Acacia savannahs are the dominant types of vegetation. Forest and woodland savannahs 
of the northern Kalahari, camel thorn savannahs of the central Kalahari and mixed shrub 
vegetation of the southern Kalahari are the region’s dominant vegetation zones (ibid.: 5). 
Approximately 90% of Omaheke is characterised as “Kalahari Sands Plateau, stabilised 
sand drift with few pans [and an] average growing period of 61-90 days”, but a very short 
dependable growing period of 6 days (Coetzee 1999: 42).12 Therefore Omaheke as a whole is 
regarded as having low suitability for crop cultivation (Mendelsohn 2006: 29). Consequently, 
rainfed agriculture is very risky whereas extensive cattle ranching predominates in terms 
of land use. Omaheke has some of the best grazing areas in the country. Inhabitants refer 
to their region as “cattle country” and claim to produce the best beef in Namibia. Carrying 
capacities range from 15 to 30 kg live mass per hectare or 12 to 24 ha per LSU. In the area 
selected for this LaLR study, the carrying capacity is 12 ha per LSU (ibid.).
In recent years, many commercial farmers have diversified out of agriculture into game 
farming, hunting and tourism activities such as running guest farms and lodges. No figures 
are available for Omaheke to quantify the extent of this process, but anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the increase in non-agricultural economic activities has been substantial in 
the freehold farming sector. These non-agricultural activities complement incomes derived 
from cattle farming.
12 “In general, the growing period is the time during a growing season when both air temperature and soil 
moisture permit crop growth. The length of a growing period is formally defined as the number of days 
during which precipitation exceeds half the potential evapotranspiration, plus the number of days to 
evapo transpire an assumed 100mm … of water from excess precipitation.” (de Pauw and Coetzee 1999: 27) 
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3.2.1 Land redistribution
The most recent data suggests that a total of 192 farms amounting to 872 230 ha of freehold 
land previously owned by white commercial farmers has been transferred to previously 
disadvantaged Namibians in Omaheke since Independence.13 Only 37% or 71 of these farms, 
amounting to 356 357 ha, have been acquired by the MLR for resettlement or small-scale 
commercial farming. Sixteen of the 71 were transferred to the MLR from the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development,14 while 55 were bought under the WSWB 
principle as from 1991. The remaining 121 farms, covering 515 873 ha in total, have been 
bought by previously disadvantaged Namibians under the AALS. In all, approximately one 
quarter of all the freehold land in Omaheke has been transferred to previously disadvantaged 
Namibians since Independence.
The minimum farm size for land reform beneficiaries in Omaheke has been set at 1 000 ha. 
However, only 20% of the approximately 531 official beneficiaries in the region have access 
to more than 1 000 ha, as Table 6 below shows.
13 Reliable data on the NRP is notoriously difficult to obtain. Unless otherwise indicated, data used in 
this section is based on the NAU database on land acquisitions of 2008 and the MLR’s “Masterlist of 
Resettlement Beneficiaries for Omaheke Region, 2008”.
14 Renamed as the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry in 2005.
Plowing for crop cultivation at skoonheid group resettlement scheme, Omaheke.
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table 6: average land allocations in Omaheke, 2008
Hectares # Beneficiaries  in category 
% Beneficiaries  
in category  cumulative %
 < 500 277 52
80
 500 to 1 000 146 27
 1 000 to 1 500   79 15   15
 1 500 to 2 000   28   5     5
 10 000 >     1   0     –
 total 531 100 100
sources: NAU database 2008; MLR Masterlist Omaheke 2008
The lowest average allocation is 50 ha for the 84 beneficiaries on the farm Vasdraai. This is 
followed by the allocation of 4 102 ha or 91 ha per beneficiary on the farm Du Plessis where 
45 beneficiaries have been settled temporarily since 1999. On the farms Gemsbokfontein, 
Kalahari Pragt and Blouberg, the average allocations are respectively 121 ha, 162 ha and 
188 ha per beneficiary.
An ongoing bone of contention among people in both Omaheke and Hardap is the principle 
of maintaining a regional balance in land allocations. This principle has given rise to a 
perception that land which traditionally belongs to the Nama and Herero communities is 
being allocated to other people from other regions. For many this remains a sore point, 
particularly against the background of government’s decision in 1991 not to entertain any 
claims to ancestral land rights. The “Herero Royal Leadership”, having described the 1991 
Land Conference resolution underlying this decision as “an abortion”, called on government 
to restore ancestral land and holy places to the Herero community (Die Republikein, 27.8.1991). 
Although government has no intention of changing its policy on ancestral land, the issue 
of ancestral land claims is still alive. Notions that Namibian land is there for all Namibians 
to share are not shared equally by all Namibians. A person in Hardap was reported to have 
commented that government was overlooking “the real owners” of the land in allocating 
land in that region, and further:
History is repeating itself. We are again colonised through the guise of a soft law. We 
were evicted from our ancestral land to benefit landless people from the North15 (The 
Namibian, 7.5.2008).
15 A metaphor for Oshiwambo-speaking people.
